In the Crosshairs

“The IDF’s unique advantage, the commanders are the secret to its strength”: Lessons learned from 1982 to 2023 | by Gal Perl

רשומה רגילה

Abstract

Until recently, the IDF forces were maneuvering in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, we need to prepare for a war in the north, if it comes. The book With Me from Lebanon was published over three decades ago, but it's main lessons – the importance of the ground, independence of forces, mission command (and command from the front) and Subterfuge – can be of use in war in the Gaza Strip in order to succeed in the war in Lebanon.

Introduction

Israel’s strategic circumstances since October 7 have brought closer the possibility that the limited conflict in the north will evolve into a full-blown war. While fighting continues in the Gaza Strip, a long, complex, confrontation with Hezbollah is being conducted on the northern front. In a way, it is reminiscent of the Security Zone days, with both sides organized and deployed, acting within seemingly agreed-upon set of rules, with most of the fighting being Standoff fire and not maneuver-based. The IDF has succeeded in attaining significant successes, including striking hundreds of Hezbollah’s operatives (as well as Palestinian terrorists), infrastructure, weaponry, and more. However, this is not enough, and the IDF must ask itself (and thoroughly examine) what are the takeaways that can be applied in a potential ground operation in Lebanon. The list extends beyond the scope of this article, nonetheless, separating the wheat from the chaff while examining the lessons learned from the war in the south, the IDF should look back and learn from our previous operational experience in Lebanon – and the many books written about it.

Firstly, the war in Gaza has ended a three-decade debate within the IDF (as part of a wider discussion being held by all western armies) regarding the relevance and the need for a ground maneuver. Time and again, the question of the necessity of maneuvering forces on the ground in an age when the IDF has in its arsenal such powerful and precise Fire-Intelligence integration capabilities that have been proven effective in a series of operations – both in the Gaza Strip and other arenas.

About six months before ‘Swords of Iron’, the Chief of the General Staff, LTG Herzi Halevi, said that the maneuver has, first and foremost, psychological value. “An adversary who knows that it may feel the boots of its enemy on the ground. This is very important for deterrence. There is a certain level of achievements in war, that cannot be attained without maneuver.”[1] The ground operation, he asserted, requires two more fundamental elements: The first, the importance of taking both responsibility and initiative; and the second, what he described as one of the significant lessons he had learned from the Russia-Ukraine war – the importance of fighting spirit.[2]

The need to dismantle Hamas as a military and governing force in the Gaza Strip has put an end to the discussion, at least in Israel, considering the goals of the war which necessitated a wide-ranging ground operation. Only ground forces in the enemy’s territory, can chase it down, disrupt its operations, make it feel hunted,[3] and minimize fire launched toward the home front.

The maneuvering forces, both the regular and the reserves, under the command of MG Yaron Finkelman, the Commander of the IDF’s Southern Command, have shown impressive fighting capacity operating in the north and center of the Gaza Strip. They struck thousands of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas operatives, destroyed military infrastructure (including tunnels, command posts, weapons depots and fortified positions), seized weaponry, and apprehended terrorists.[4] Considering the sense of urgency, the reserves for the ground forces have shown themselves to be a force multiplier, despite years of neglect. Operational experience, maturity and judgement, professional know-how and high motivation enabled them to quickly make up the differences between them and the regular forces, and in many cases even to lead war efforts.

This conclusion is not born only of research, but also based on what I saw and felt during battle, as the reserve Marine-Paratroopers battalion in which I serve (the 697th Battalion) was called up under the “Fire Arrows” (551st) Brigade. Three weeks later, the battalion was already fighting under the command of LTC (res.) Tzach Ekshtein, in Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahya, al-Atara, and Sheikh Radwan in Gaza.[5] Judging by my conversations with commanders and soldiers from other units who took part in the fighting, including the 55th Brigade, the 16th, and more, they too shared that experience.

The fact that the ground maneuver has been proven to be the correct operational response for the southern front, does not mean that it is necessarily the right response in the north.[6] However, we must prepare. What’s more – as supposedly said by former Chief of the General Staff, LTG Rafael Eitan (Raful), the problem with the enemy is that they don’t attend the final briefing. [7]

Learning and Preparing for the Next War

Hezbollah has long ago ceased to be similar to the guerilla organization the IDF fought during the years it stayed in Lebanon, or the commando divisions that the IDF faced in 2006. Since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has grown in scale, acquired advanced weaponry and an arsenal of ballistic rockets and missiles (some of them PGMs), as well as AT launchers, set up tunnel networks, and more. Moreover, its personnel have gained operational experience fighting in the civil war in Syria. In an article on the subject, BG (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel proposed “to treat Hezbollah like a regular army, like the Syrian commando during the 1982 Lebanon War”.[8] As such, it is important to learn how the IDF fought these terror and guerilla forces (PLO terrorists) as well as the Syrian commando during the war in 1982.

Even though the shelf of books written on the First Lebanon War is not that heavily laden, there are a few relevant volumes. Without denigrating books written by researchers and journalists, and it is enough to mention Israel’s Lebanon War, by Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari,[9] it is clear that books written by commanders are of special import, as their conclusions and insights are affirmed by those who were there themselves and led soldiers on the battlefield.

Like in most militaries, active IDF officers do not often publish books about incidents from the recent past. Prominent examples include The Heights of Courage, by BG (res.) Avigdor Kahalani about the armor battalion under his command during the Yom Kippur War,[10] and Undeclared War, by BG (res.) Moshe Tamir (Chiko) about his time in Lebanon while serving in the Golani infantry Brigade – a book which contained important observations and criticism of the IDF’s stay in Lebanon, the fighting against Hezbollah and the strategy employed by the IDF.[11] It's no small matter when a senior officer still in active duty publishes a book in which they include criticism of the military, and this shines a positive light on the IDF as an organization which allows critical discussions aimed at learning from its failures just as much as its successes.

One of the finer books amongst these, that brought forth insights that may be applicable to a looming war in Lebanon, is the book written by MG (res.) Yoram Yair (Ya-Ya), With Me from Lebanon (Maarachot, 1990, Hebrew edition). In it, he describes the fighting by the paratroopers brigade under his command during the war, from the landing at the source of the Awali River in June 1982 and to arriving in Beirut. In a way the author gave himself an easy time, as he only described the brigade’s battles during the first week of the war, even though it can be said that the war continued for at least two more years, if not more, until the IDF’s withdrawal in May 2000. Yair chose to focus on describing a week of fighting – from the landing and up to Beirut, while the IDF stayed in Lebanon for 18 more years.

Yair’s book is about an efficient, surprising maneuver.[13] It also talks about shrewd field commanders who took initiative, and dedicated forces who showed great fighting spirit. Readers would learn about the dilemmas, the mistakes, the successes, how the brigade conducted integrated lethal, Joint Warfare fighting, as well as the challenges and difficulties. Although the book describes the actions of a force sent deep into enemy territory, its lessons are also appropriate for a scenario of a force sent to the front.

In the preface to the book, then Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Rabin, wrote that the Lebanon War had once again illustrated “The IDF’s unique advantage, […] that the commanders are the secret to its strength […] [The war] once again proved the necessity of the infantry corps. In the age of planes, missiles, and computers, there is still no alternative for a soldier creating facts with their body, legs, and mind. It is clear from the lines written in this book, how sophisticated military though and walking down the old, but good, road of employing stratagems to surprise the enemy, spares sweat and blood, and enables military successes. In places where tanks had not yet gone and planes could not penetrate, only the infantryman could get the job done, and with success” (p. 7). In many ways, this could be said about the ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip during ‘Swords of Iron’, and this is what it will be like during the possible war in Lebanon.

Surprising the enemy – appearing in a spot that will send it off-balance

When the government decided to commence operation ‘Peace for Galilee’, the 98th (then 96th) Division was tasked with an amphibious landing at the mouth of the Awali in Lebanon. The main force of the division was a Paratroopers brigade under the command of Yair, enhanced with engineering, artillery and armor. The operation deep in Lebanese territory was surprising, and enabled the IDF to quickly maneuver north, toward Beirut.

On June 6, 1982, the men boarded the Israeli navy’s tank landers and sailed toward Lebanon. The brigade executed an amphibious landing at the mouth of the Awali. “Unlike some of the stories, these aren’t safe shores; we are drawing near the greatest of dangers – war” (p. 22).

After the landing, Yair was unsure how to move northward. “Going straight toward the enemy’s main force would not properly make use of the advantages of a brigade like mine; this is not fighting characteristic of paratroopers. Paratroopers’ strength is in flanking and appearing – sometimes by air, sometimes by sea – in the most surprising spots, where the enemy cannot prepare to meet them. This time too, we cannot give up on the principle of flanking, and we need to find a way to surprise the enemy on land, difficult as it may be – to appear in a spot that will send the enemy off balance and bring about its collapse” (p. 52).

The “Tighozet” route, through the Chouf mountains, was the most challenging line of advance along the coast. “Seeing as both the enemy’s mode of operation and its location are a riddle, I can only check that I read the map properly, and understand the environment; so that the route I chose to move the forces along really does allow every component – paratroopers, armor, artillery, engineering – to make the best use of its advantages and at the same time, to mask its weaknesses”(p. 53).

Yair and his paratroopers waged a long, tasking campaign (70 km). Even though on the surface, choosing the mountainous route was supposed to slow the brigade down, in practice Yair’s choice paid off and the paratroopers were the first force to arrive in Beirut. A significant portion of the fighting was led by the reconnaissance battalion under the command of LTC Doron Almog (Avrotzky), which consisted of “the three brigade-level companies – recon, engineering, and AT, with all their APCs – the battalion commander with eight tanks, and part of the brigade’s medical company” (p. 92).[13] The brigade’s reconnaissance company lead the advance, under the command of Israel Ziv, with the Battalion CO Almog alongside.

Yair described the recon battalion’s advance “The men are overloaded, and the climb is very difficult. The bulletproof plates under the vests are warm, making them sweat and lose fluids” (p. 73). There is a clear lesson here for the next war. Soldiers, especially those in the vanguard, will have to be light and agile to operate in the mountainous Lebanese terrain. If not, the force will not be able to fight efficiently, as it will buckle under the heavy weight on its back.[14]

Six kilometers east of Damour, the vanguard met the enemy. “In a few seconds, the lack of water was forgotten, and the unit is in the midst of a charge. Israel is charging along with part of the force along the ridge above, and Doron is running with some of the others on the road. In a matter of minutes, the charge is over: ten terrorists killed, ten terrorists captured” (p. 73). The water has run out, but Ziv insists to give water to the prisoners too.

This is just a small incident, but there is much in the little there is. First of all, the importance of Command from the front. Years later, MG (res.) Almog wrote: “Leading up front allows each commander to get, in the shortest time possible, the best information about the enemy’s state, the condition of our forces, about the terrain, the troops’ morale and how tired they are, and about what we call in a sit-rep ‘additional factors’. The commander’s presence at the front in critical points, like moments of crisis in the battle, allow them to be an example to their men – which could bring about a shift in momentum, breathing new energies in soldiers and commanders alike”.[15] This observation was proved in previous operations in Gaza,[16]as well as in the ongoing war, and will not be any different in Lebanon.

For instance, at midnight between October 28 and 29, 2023, the men of the 551st brigade crossed the security fence near Kibbutz Erez and into the Gaza Strip, moving on foot for three kilometers toward Beit Hanoun. The 697th battalion was at the head of the advance,[17] with an armor company that had been put under it in the vanguard. The company CO was in the lead.[18] At first light, the battalion struck the outskirts of the urban area. The recon company, under the command of MAJ Moshe Leiter, led a rapid advance from one building to the next on the left flank, encountered terrorists and struck them. On the right flank, company B encountered terrorists in a building. A team from the company and from the battalion XO’s command group fired toward the terrorists, while a tank fired two shots at the building. The battalion set up camp on the outskirts of the area. During the first battle, the battalion CO and the brigade CO, COL Ido Kass, were nearby and in complete control, while the two company commanders were in the lead.

Secondly, even under the stresses combat brings, the logistical difficulties, the fear, and the rage toward the enemy, the commanders did not give up on the IDF’s values – purity of arms and combat morals. My battalion CO often says that moral behavior means being willing to pay the price, in this case lack of water, of adhering to the values of the IDF. This approach is also apparent in the words of the Chief of the General Staff and the CO of the Southern Command while addressing the since the beginning of the war, about the need to fight without forsaking the IDF’s ethics.[19]

Back in 1982, In a different battle in the same area, a battalion of terrorists set up an ambush, however, the brigade’s vanguard spotted it ahead of time and utilized subterfuge.[20] The AT company and an armor force moved along a route heading to the village, while the battalion CO and the engineering unit advanced on the ridge up above the ambush. Approximately 50 terrorists trapped between the forces were killed, and about 20 captured.

The brigade’s last battle before Beirut was against a Syrian commando battalion in Shemlan. The CO of the Northern Command, MG Amir Drori, and the Chief of the General Staff, LTG Rafael Eitan (Raful), pushed Yair to take over the village as quickly as possible so he could join the Christian Phalanges’ forces. “The reason for the pressure from ‘above’ was clear to me. It is equally clear, however, that I couldn’t put too much pressure on the officers under my command. I need to take into account my orders and put in any changes possible into the plan to ensure the mission is complete as quickly as possible. But I need to act like a pressure valve and keep the commanders under me safe” (p. 152).

In the battle, he wrote, “Both sides, the Israeli paratroopers on the one hand and the Syrian commandos on the other, are now akin to a pair of boxers in a ring, just before the gong is heard, signaling the end of a long, equal match between them. Both of them have given their all, so they can win” (p. 154). It was clear to Yair that “the victor would be the one who could manage to muster the last of their strength, despite the pain and exhaustion, to lay one more fist, a strong, accurate strike, that would bring their opponent to the matt and decide the battle” (p. 154).

As such, when the AT company’s advance was halted, he decided the right spot for him to make the best impact on the battle was in front. “In order to spur the exhausted soldiers into this last decisive effort, to squeeze the last inch of energy that they still had left, the XO and I run up to the head of the column (p. 154). The charge, with the brigade commander and his deputy at the front, decided the battle and the brigade’s advance toward Beirut was secured.

The unit’s fighting spirit and cohesion harnessed by commanders leading from the front were the reason hurt, exhausted forces could stand up to the task and keep moving forward. In this regard, Yair wrote: “The professionalism, the order, and the discipline of the unit high as they are, are not enough to move the men to fulfil any task during battle, when facing death. A commander who is not be able to gather their unit and will not be able to cultivate solidarity between soldiers and commanders during war, will not have at their disposal the training, order, and discipline that were instilled during training” (p. 83).

This is how it has always been. In the final battle before Beirut, in the battles the IDF has fought since then, in ‘Swords of Iron’, in the Gaza Strip. Fighting spirit is also the reason that the 697th, one day after suffering casualties and injuries in Beit Hanoun, on November 10, 2023, rose like the phoenix, went on an offensive, killed Hamas operatives and continued fulfilling its tasks. There is no alternative to fighting spirit, and just like Noah’s ark, it is built before the flood – in training and exercises, war simulations at every level (company, battalion and up), whether in Joint Warfare exercises (for example, division-level exercises or the 2022 exercise in Cyprus), cultivating and teaching commanders to act with initiative and aggressiveness. It is built during service in active units, team-building events for commanders, and in-depth looks at doctrine, history and more.

Lessons

The 98th Division’s maneuver deep in Lebanon is one of the only cases in the history of Israel’s wars of a successful joint action on the front and within the depths of enemy territory. However, as the IDF History Department researcher Saul Bronfeld has said, “the successful landing helped bring about the quick collapse of the terrorists organized resistance south of the Awali, however, it was not enough to create a strategic flanking action of Beirut. IDF brigade only surrounded Beirut after the ceasefire and arrived at the city only after the hard fighting in the valley.”[21]

The book With Me from Lebanon may be short and succinct, however, there is much good advice and excellent insights for commanders, from the fire-team to the brigade level. Reading it, especially after fighting in Gaza, I have found several important lessons relevant to Lebanon as well:

Land, land, and again, land. Before the enemy, before any other factor that affects the ability of military units to act – is analyzing the terrain. The ability to glean potential shapers from the terrain, including key locations, kill zones, controlling and controlled areas and more, is the foundation of any operational plan. In Lebanon, as Yair showed when he led his brigade on a surprise flanking maneuver, terrain is a limiting factor as well as an enabling one. The terrain in the mostly flat Gaza Strip, with the IDF moving relatively short distances, posed less of a challenge for maneuvering forces. Lebanon is a whole other ball game.

“Together we stand alone”. This slogan, adopted at the time by an IDF's Paratroopers battalion commander for his unit,[22] needs to be one of a series of lessons that should be taken into account by the units that will maneuver in Lebanon, as well as those still in active combat in Gaza. The battalion is an autonomous, independent unit that is not reliant on the “mother brigade” and can act on its own. The size of the area and Hezbollah’s deployment requires to act while preserving mutual aid between forces, making sure to operate within the principle of fully utilizing every force, while employing fire and support components as possible. However, the battalion must be able to solve its problems on its own, as Hezbollah is able to challenge the IDF in a way that its forces, even an entire brigade may fail to provide much needed aid.

Mission-oriented command is a way of life. During the war in Gaza, the IDF rolled back to a mission-oriented command approach, abandoning the Micromanagement method typical of its years of routine security activity. According to this approach, the commander in the field has the liberty to “choose unexpected plans-of-action in order to complete the assigned mission”,[23] as if they wait for instructions, they will never be able to capitalize on unforeseen opportunities.[24] To put this approach into practice, an organizational culture that facilitates the understanding the commander’s intent must be created, considering the tension between that and focusing on a particular task; mutual trust based on capabilities as well as good communication built on a shared understanding of combat doctrine, tolerance for mistakes made without malicious intent, a built-in tendency for action and showing initiative, a strong link between authority and responsibility.[25]

Moreover, the quality of a military unit is measured by the authorities and freedom of operation given, as well as the expectations set of the junior command. While war can and has made the IDF choose the mission-orientated command approach even when these characteristics are not extant. The scope and intensity of the fighting, the need to make timely decisions, and senior command’s inability to be always involved with each force and places – all a natural part of war – has forced the IDF’s senior command to trust its field commanders and give them freedom of operation.[26] They, in turn, have proven themselves worthy of that trust. In Lebanon, the anticipated magnitude of fighting, the enemy’s known characteristics, the challenging terrain and other factors, make the commanders’ understanding of two levels up and one level below imperative.

Subterfuge is a core skill. Each adversary system has an obvious center of gravity (a controlling area, a C&C center, central structure, a component which if struck destabilizes the adversary’s organization, striking it off-balance). At its core, subterfuge is analyzing the adversary, identifying this center of gravity, and understanding how to strike it in a rapid, unexpected manner. This was how Yair’s brigade operated in the First Lebanon War; this is how the IDF acted during “Swords of Iron”. As said by BG (res.) Tamir, the enemy’s system in the Gaza Strip has been dismantled as a result of the integration of the intense fire effort (“The refractive element”) – which damage the tunnels just moments before the forces on the ground maneuvered into enemy territory, and denied Hamas operatives the cover of the subterranean space – and the ground maneuver which chased down and killed Hamas operatives who were forced to remain above ground.[27]

Improvisation is founded on doctrine. It is important to act according to doctrine dealing with Command and Control (C&C) and the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), and of course according to the good old blue handbook (which changes color with every edition).[28] Improvisation, when done right, is based on doctrine (and everything is written). It can be said that improvisation is actually just adapting doctrine to the given circumstances (the adversary, the terrain, our force, and of course, the ‘H’). When it isn’t done this way – the results are often grave.

Conclusion

Until recently, the soldiers of the 98th Division, under the command of BG Dan Goldfuss, have been fighting in Khan Yunis. On October 7, they fought to stop the Nukhba operatives attacking Israeli communities and IDF bases nearby the Gaza Strip. After then, between December 2023 and April 2024, the division stormed Khan Yunis, struck Hamas terrorists and destroyed weaponry and infrastructure, engaging in integrated warfare both below and above ground.[29]

At the same time, we must prepare for the next war, should it come. This preparation requires us to ask difficult questions, including how competent would forces be, namely the reserves, if the IDF had the time train them? Has the IDF been training properly in the years prior to the war, in a manner that simulates the war well enough, whatever form it takes? Have we prepared our forces well enough? The IDF has already begun combatting tunnels in Khan Yunis – a decision that required willingness to take risks (the subterranean domain neutralizes many of the IDF’s Joint Warfare advantages), boldness, and professional skill therefore avoided as much as possible.

Another question relates to the duration of the fighting, the patterns of combat and the way the IDF operates. In the past, there have been conversations in the IDF about reducing the duration of war (or at least, removing the home front from the area of combat). Six months into the war we can confidently say that neither this nor that has happened. This issue requires thinking about the rest of the war from a standpoint of managing equipment stores and order of battle (both regular and reserves), as well as how the IDF is going to be set up in the field (martial law, establishing a security zone, and more open questions), as Hamas has changed how it is deployed in the Gaza Strip, transitioning into waging a guerilla war – the IDF too, has reduced its forces and moved to conducting small-scale offensive operations.

The war has changed shape since it first started, and has shifted into its second stage, similar to what happened in Judea & Samaria after operation “Defensive Shield”. It has become “the IDF’s mop-up war against the recovery of Hamas in areas that have been taken over and abandoned, to which the terror organization has returned, once again holding them in its grasp.”[30]The IDF has continued to act to combat this recovery. An example is operation “Local Surgery” (March 18 – April 1, 2024), during which the 162nd Division raided Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza.[31]

At the battalion level, with every objective we were tasked with attacking, we sat down and analyzed it so we could act not only with the appropriate force and at the right time, but also in a manner that would deny the enemy any opportunity to set up a campaign to resist us. We must assume the Hezbollah will be able to set up one, so there are not shortcuts in this case either. CCVWH (Center of gravity, critical assets, vulnerabilities, what will decide, how to decide), has been and will remain the leading approach, because at the end of the day, there is a mission to fulfill. The terrain, independent forces, familiarity with combat literature, mission-oriented command (and leading from the front), and subterfuge are the essence of the main lessons we should learn from Yair’s book – and from the war in Gaza – to succeed in the war in Lebanon.

This article is dedicated to my brothers in arms from the 697th battalion. Those that are alive and well, those that are injured – may they recover quickly – and most of all, those that fell in battle: MAJ (res.) Moshe Yedidia Leiter, SGM (res.) Yosef Chaim (Yossi) Hershkowitz, MSG (res.) Matan Meir, MSG (res.) Sergey Shmerkin, and the two tank crewmen from the 14th Brigade who fought with us shoulder to shoulder, and fell while in battle while deployed with the neighboring battalion, MAJ (res.) Aryeh Rein, and MSG (res.) Nitai Meisels. May their memory be a blessing. May we be worthy of their sacrifice.

The author thanks MG (res.) Yair Golan, COL (res.) Boaz Zalmanowicz, COL Yaron Simsolo, COL Ido Kass, and LTC (res.) Aviram Ring for their excellent comments on this paper.

[1] Halevi, H. (23 May 2023). Chief of the General Staff’s talk in a conference in Herzliyya, Reichmann University.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Mattis, J. and West, B. (2022). Call Sign: Chaos, (Hebrew version), Ministry of Defense and Modan, p. 122; at the time, the IDF learned quite a bit from the US’ experience with urban warfare in Iraq. During the Second Intifada, the CO of the 890th Paratroopers Battalion, LTC Amir Baram, adopted a saying inspired from the commanders of the USMC (probably Mattis), as the battalion’s slogan: “Patience, dedication, and the occasional bullet between the eyes”.

[4] IDF. (November 7, 2023). Statement of the Commanding Officer of the Southern Command: “We are fighting […] in the heart of Gaza City. In the heart of terror […] we will not stop […] Until we are victorious.” IDF site.

[5] The battalion killed, with fire and Armor support and in direct confrontation, approximately 150 Hamas terrorists, destroyed infrastructure and weaponry and met all objectives in a no less than astonishing manner. A reserve battalion at its best. This came at a cost. And that cost was high. During the fighting, four of the battalion’s soldiers fell, and approximately sixty were injured.

[6] Ortal, E. (February 2024). “The War of October 7 – and the One to Follow”, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, pp. 6-23.

[7] General Eitan supposedly originally said “Kapak shtaim” (קפ"ק 2) a term referring to the second, final briefing before an operation, during which final coordination between all participating units is made, and the commanders strengthen their understanding of the CO’s plan as well as what the neighboring units are planning. See: Command and Control During Ground Operations (August 2015, Hebrew ver.). Ground Forces, p. 137.

[8] Finkel, M. (May 2023). "Coordination of expectations: what is victory in the next Lebanon war and what is its price", Dado Center Journal 39, P. 128

[9] Schiff, Z. and Ya’ari, E. (1985) Israel’s Lebanon War. Touchstone

[10] Kahalni, A. The Heights of Courage. (1992, Prager [Hebrew ver. 1975, Schocken])

[11] Tamir, M. (2005). Undeclared War, (Hebrew version), Maarachot.

[12] Shelah, O. (2015). Dare to Win, (Hebrew version), Yedioth Books, p. 173

[13] On a personal note, this was the first book of war memoirs that I read (as a boy). My father, Aryeh Perl, an officer with the paratroopers who fought in the brigade and was the deputy CO of the medical company, refused to tell me about any of his experiences. After the battle of Damour, the company was split up: one Detachment, under my father’s command, was put under the brigade’s reconnaissance battalion, which was commanded by Almog, while the second remained with the rest of the brigade. Eventually Dad told me about the landing from the sea; about the fear he felt when they were hit by mortar fire; about a wonderful meal they made in Qabr Chamoun, after the fight; about how he rushed in a jeep with another doctor to save an injured Lebanese baby (they “took over” a hospital by singlehandedly and found the right infusion). About how he kicked out two doctors when he found out they had looted Lebanese property. About the improvised force he was attached to, that took over the President’s palace in Beirut (and the people threw rice at them), and about the World Cup finals that he saw in a flat in town. The rest I had to read in Yair’s book.

[14] Shelah, O. (January 7, 2011). A heavyweight question. Maariv (Hebrew)

[15] Almog, D. (June 2012). Commander's place in battle. Maarachot 443, p. 29 (Hebrew)

[16] Druck, D. (2022). "The combined and joint battle 2006-2014", in: The development of the combined battle in the IDF. (Editor: M. Finkel). Maarachot and Moden, p. 297 (Hebrew)

[17] On the first night only half the battalion went in, because of a justified concern that there would not be any buildings fit to hold all the men. The second half reattached the next night.

[18] The company was part of the 8108th Battalion under the 679th Reserve Armor Brigade.

[19] Barnea, N. (February 16, 2024). Bibi no-no. Yedioth Ahronoth (Hebrew)

[20] Almog (June 2012), p. 28

[21] Bronfeld, S. (2022). Landing in the Awali estuary – "What more can you ask of us homeland". Yesodot 3, p. 66 (Hebrew)

[22] Finkelman, Y. (November 19, 2008). Debriefing Operation "Double Challenge" Paratrooper Patrol Battalion 5135. 35th Brigade (Hebrew)

[23] Shamir, E. (2014). The Pursuit of Mission Command, (Hebrew version), Maarachot and Modan, p. 19

[24] Ibid, p. 51

[25] Ibid, p. 51

[26] Tamir (2005), p. 275

[27] Interview with BG (res.) Moshe (Chiko) Tamir, Kfar Daniel, February 19, 2024

[28] A pocket handbook consisting of a set of instructions, tips and notes about C&C and fighting doctrine given to the junior command in the IDF.

[29] Goldfuss, D. (March 13, 2024). Statement of the commander of the 98th Paratroopers Division. Khan Yunis

[30] Ziv, I. (March 22, 2024). The action at Shifa was the opening shot of the 'Second Iron Sword War'. N12 (Hebrew)

[31] Levy, S. (April 1, 2024). Suicide terrorists and documentation from October 7: new details about the operation in Shifa. Mako (Hebrew)

"Nonetheless, We Need to Maneuver | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

“Defeat the enemy, defeat it quickly, in such a way that at the end of the day no one will ask who won and who lost.” These words of the former chief of staff continue to resonate today, and when voices emerge, arguing that the ground option should be a last resort, it is important to emphasize – only a combination of firepower, a defense system, and smart ground maneuvering can achieve a clear victory, one that we have not seen in a long time ago

In recent months, the Institute for National Security Studies has published two contradicting approaches regarding offensive maneuver warfare and its relevance to coping with present and future threats facing Israel. This article maintains that the IDF should engage in maneuver warfare, and to this end, it should maintain a competent land force, as stated by one approach. Yet, as the other approach states, maneuver warfare should be carried out in a context and way that serves specific strategic and operative objectives, given the challenges and the conflicts

In his article “Whoever Flees from Maneuver Warfare Will Not Win” (special publication, Institute for National Security Studies, December 23, 2021), Ofer Shelah, a former Knesset member and company commander in the paratroopers, argued that “fast and decisive maneuver is a necessary condition for shortening – and not prolonging – the campaign: whatever the definition of the achievement is, it is reached more quickly when all of the force is used from the outset of the war and not only as a possible subsequent option, engaging with the enemy and bringing the war to it.” In contrast, Col. (res.) Ron Tira, a former fighter pilot, in his article “Maneuver: ‘In Order To’” (INSS Insight No. 1548, January 11, 2022), argued that “in many of its conflicts over the last three decades, Israel did not seek to gain anything from its enemy, but simply to bring a swift end to hostilities Israel fell into that do not benefit it. At least some of these conflicts erupted due to a process of escalation that went out of control or to a miscalculation. In such situations it is certainly possible that it is more rational for Israel to choose a fundamental strategic state of defense and use its forces in a way that brings about a quick, low־cost end to the fighting.” Tira concluded that “it is important to guard against the desire for maneuvers come what may, and the decision must be examined in the light of the context. It is important to avoid seeing ground maneuver as part of an ethos, or to demonstrate that lessons have been learned.”

Tira rightly says that the decision to engage in maneuver warfare needs to be in the context of events and not as a test of courage or a default option, especially as Israel does not intend to conquer territories from its enemies for extended periods. Indeed, maneuver warfare should only be carried out when it optimally serves Israel’s strategic and operative objectives, unlike other alternatives that take a lesser toll in blood and money. In addition, an operative plan for a limited operation should not be a large־scale offensive action that has been scaled down and adjusted. This is a different plan, Tira wrote, and “the IDF toolbox also needs such plans.” In any case, he correctly wrote that the operative plan should strive to end the conflict quickly in order to reduce the harm to the home front. These correct premises, however, led the author to an incorrect conclusion, according to which maneuver warfare has almost become superfluous, except in a large־scale conflict. It may be, he noted, that Israel can achieve its objectives in actions that are below the threshold of war – especially as the duration of the conflict could be too short to prepare ground forces for effective maneuvers.

It is true that Hezbollah and Hamas pose a serious threat to the home front through their arsenals of missiles and rockets (some of them precision־guided), which could impair the IDF’s recruitment of reserve forces, disrupt its operational activity, and even affect decision־making processes on the national level. The enemy has also improved its ability to penetrate Israeli territory. This threat requires Israel to operate within a short timetable to remove the enemy, using all the tools at its disposal. The first most available and most flexible of them is the air force, which can attack thousands of targets a day, and standoff fire forces.

The IDF currently has impressive and extremely effective firepower and intelligence capabilities that operate in coordination, as has been demonstrated in conflicts and in the “war between the wars.” Fire support is essential, as it is capable of striking and disrupting the enemy’s operative capabilities and destroying its strategic assets, which will deter it from another campaign for years to come and will force it to invest its resources in repairing the damage.

But the achievement that the fire support will bring about during the fighting itself will be certainly limited. First, the enemy has adapted and, in effect, has built its military force so that it can continue to launch and operate despite the impressive target production and destruction enterprise that the IDF has built. Second, after several days of fighting, the number of targets decreases. The IDF knows how to quickly destroy the list of preplanned targets that it has accumulated, while the enemy “catches on quickly” and avoids exposure. This is not to claim that intelligence and precision fire will not bring about achievements. Sometimes a threat can be removed through the use of standoff warfare alone, as demonstrated in Operation Black Belt in 2019 for example. But usually a pattern develops that prolongs the duration of the campaign due to the difficulty of bringing about achievements using fire support and the reluctance of using other means. The quest to shorten the duration of the campaign as much as possible makes maneuver warfare an essential tool, whether as the main effort or as a supplement to the fire effort.

The key to success lies in combining fire support with maneuver warfare, at a fast rate of operation that poses a real threat to the survivability and functional capability of the enemy and could cause it to cease the campaign. The reason for this success is that maneuver warfare, by its very nature, maintains a presence on the ground. Even if the enemy has become accustomed to the fire support used against it and continues to fight, it is unable to predict the movement and actions of forces on the ground that disrupt its activity, create a sense of being pursued, and diminish the firing that the enemy launches toward the home front. Furthermore, the capture of territory – even temporary – has cultural־psychological significance and influence among Israel’s enemies, as territory is seen as having historical, cultural, and religious value. Only maneuver warfare can hold territory and thus create cognitive pressure on the enemy.

Maneuver warfare is important also due to the need to escape from the “dead end,” a concept coined by Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, commander of the Ground Forces, and Brig. Gen. Eran Ortal, commander of the Dado Center. The series of operations that the IDF has waged in the past two decades – all using a deterrent logic and some lasting longer than Israel expected – have trapped the IDF in a vicious cycle of operating from one deterrent־erosive operation to the next, while the lack of willingness to use ground forces in these operations is known to its enemies and provides them with an advantage and defense.

Therefore, Israel must develop a decisive mode of operation that includes an effective defensive effort and that, in the words of Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi, prevents the enemy from offsetting the achievements of the IDF’s offense through its own offensive measures, which can cause casualties. In essence, it is a combined campaign of maneuver warfare and fire support at a fast pace, because speed is critical for Israel due to the threat to the home front. Combined action enables the IDF to effectively strike the enemy’s forces, to deprive it of assets essential to its operational doctrine (missile launchers, command and control systems, and tunnels), and to reach an end state under conditions that are positive for Israel and perhaps will even shape a new, better reality.

Both Shelah and Tira agree that the IDF needs to carry out a significant reform of the ground forces so that its forces are relevant, and, most of all, fast and durable (protected), as Israel’s enemies will threaten the survivability of the maneuvering ground forces on the battlefield through explosive charges, anti־tank missiles, artillery, and additional capabilities.

The IDF must strengthen its ability to quickly mobilize its regular and reserve forces, which can be recruited and activated as combined combat teams that will quickly maneuver into the enemy’s territory and damage Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s military forces. These IDF forces will know to quickly move and transfer from arena to arena, to operate flexibly and engage in close multi־branch jointness with fire and intelligence, and to raid and kill the enemy in direct contact. As early as 2005, Lt. Col. Amir Baram, a former Paratroopers Brigade officer (and later commander of Northern Command) wrote that the main lesson from the training that his unit carried out is that “Hezbollah cannot be defeated without close contact.” This statement is still true today.

These combat teams will be able to locate and destroy the “vanishing enemy,” which avoids direct conflict with the army as much as it can and fortifies itself in tunnels and bunkers. In the words of Brig. Gen. Ortal, the combat teams will “turn on the light,” and expose the enemy, especially its missile launchers that are firing on Israel’s home front, and “extinguish the fire,” by destroying these systems and thus depriving the enemy of the main component of its operational doctrine.

The success of these forces depends first and foremost on high־quality, initiative־taking, determined and cunning commanders who lead the fighting, and the IDF must invest in maintaining and developing this set of commanders in both regular service and in the reserves.

Such maneuver warfare, which in a limited conflict has a narrow scope (a raid), is relevant and sometimes necessary due to the need to shorten the duration of the fighting and to reduce fire on the home front. In a large־scale campaign, where maneuver warfare is used with a large order of battle, creating a threat of losing territory – a strategic asset for all nations and states – losing sovereignty and survivability could even cause the enemy to agree to ending the fighting.

The context is important, and maneuver warfare must contribute to achieving the strategic objectives of the campaign. At the same time, however, any discussion of maneuver warfare, its scope, and its aims must start from the fact that the IDF has competent, willing, and skilled capability to maneuver on the ground, which it will use as needed.

Former Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi has said that in the next campaign, the IDF must “defeat the enemy, defeat it quickly in such a way that at the end of the day no one will ask who won and who lost.” This command remains true, and to this end a campaign is needed that combines firepower, as precise as possible, and a maneuvering mass that harms the enemy in its territory, and creates pressure that it will not be able to withstand.

The General Staff: Management and Decision Making | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

At the outset of World War II, "the results of the German General Staff’s thinking and decision making on the battlefield outdid those of its French counterpart" (p. 11). This is what Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi wrote in the preface to a new book about the IDF General Staff by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel. Kochavi here underscores the importance of the General Staff and its ability to influence a campaign, in the present and in the future.

At the outset of World War II, "the results of the German General Staff’s thinking and decision making on the battlefield outdid those of its French counterpart" (p. 11). This is what Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi wrote in the preface to a new book, "The Israeli General Staff" ( Modan, Maarachot Publishing, 2020), about the IDF General Staff by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel. Kochavi here underscores the importance of the General Staff and its ability to influence a campaign, in the present and in the future. Thus, he continued, "The General Staff must be a body that specializes in management and decision making for the immediate, short, medium, and long term, and especially in time of war, which is its greatest test. It requires training, knowledge, skill, teamwork and a critical attitude, and curiosity and creativity" (p. 11).

In this book, the author, formerly commander of an armored brigade and head of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, continues his previous book, The Chief of Staff, and the effort to analyze thoroughly and fundamentally the roles and challenges of the General Staff, which is the IDF’s strategic command that includes headquarters, military districts, and other functions, and to try to explain how it learns, plans, and functions.

The book includes four chapters of test cases. Each chapter concludes with a summary and the author’s recommendations, which are intended to help the IDF General Staff avoid the difficulties and errors presented in the chapter. In the fifth chapter the author presents his main insights and his recommendations for improving the work of the General Staff.

Methodology

The book presents a comparative analysis of the General Staff’s performance with regard to four roles and challenges: the planning processes in the General Staff, including multi-year planning for force buildup, operational planning for wartime, and planning during wartime; various learning processes of the General Staff, including lessons learned from war, learning from foreign armies, and processes of change; patterns of organizing in the face of evolving challenges, including the establishment of new staff bodies and the direct management of the General Staff; and chiefs of staff coping with a General Staff that opposed the outlook and changes they sought to implement, and with differences of approach within the General Staff.

Although the study is not a historical documentary, it was based on material from the IDF’s History Department and on biographies, media publications, and interviews the author conducted with senior officers who served in the General Staff over the years. Although each period was marked by different challenges and contexts, there are similar characteristics that can instruct about the recurring challenges, responsibilities, and roles of the General Staff. At the same time, and as the author insisted, it is difficult to examine the periods comparatively, since each period entails its particular challenges and strategic context.

The book’s analysis is detailed and systematic and offers enlightening insights. For example, in the chapter describing operational planning (planning for war), which is the principal process that the General Staff executes in the field of force, the author outlines the main characteristics of the General Staff planning process, including the nature of the plan and its basic assumptions, the need for modular and flexible planning, and the creation of coordination and synchronization between the General Staff, the command, and the operational branch (p. 97). Despite this, the author notes the analysis of former chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot:

An operational plan is designed to enable development of the required knowledge, to form the basis for a common language and the "compass" for force buildup…The nature of operational plans change when moving from plan to command in light of context. Therefore, the Chief of Staff emphasized that the plan is a means. The planning process, force buildup of the operational capabilities, and the readiness of the forces—those are the important things. (p. 103)

Indeed, throughout the chapter the emphasis is on the need for mental flexibility, planning, force buildup, and formulated responses that can be adapted to a changing reality.

A particularly fascinating chapter describes how the General Staff learns during combat, including through friction with the enemy (pp. 219-234). An example is the learning process that the General Staff conducted through the Central Command in the first year of the second intifada. The General Staff was faced with the dilemma of whether to continue defensive preparations or to transition to an offensive that included large-scale infiltration of forces into the heart of the refugee camps—a move that entailed possible achievements in the form of harming senior members of terrorist organizations and the destruction of weapons and ammunition, as well as considerable risk, since it included fighting in urban areas and in the heart of a civilian population.

The author quotes Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland, then-head of the Planning Directorate:

Those who led to the approval of the operations were the commanders of the infantry brigades. At that time, the IDF was blessed with four of the best brigade commanders it has ever had: Aviv Kochavi from the Paratroopers, Chico Tamir from Golani, Imad Fares from Givati, ​​and Yair Golan from Nahal. The commanders, and especially Aviv and Chico, persuaded the commander of the Central Command, Itzik Eitan, and the chief of staff to approve the operations. The operational achievements of these raids were partial, but the fact that the operations were carried out with a minimum of casualties—among both the soldiers and the civilian population—gave the assurance that it would be possible, when necessary, to enter and take over West Bank cities. One or two months later, the time for this did come [as part of Operation Defensive Shield]. (p. 228)

Although this is a fascinating example, it might have been better to include in the book another test case that has not yet been thoroughly investigated, and to examine the learning process conducted by the General Staff and the Southern Command in 2006-2008. The commander of the Gaza Division at the time, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Moshe "Chico" Tamir, a veteran of the Golani Brigade, initiated “constant friction” with the enemy through raids carried out by infantry and armored battalions, as well as elite units (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, 2020). These raids were necessary, according to then-Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, due to the need to "handle terrorist activity on the other side of the fence," including frequent firing of Qassams on the city of Sderot and other localities. "We did not have an ‘Iron Dome,’ we did not have a good answer, and we had to take action against this thing, in order to restore security" (interview with G. Ashkenazi, February 21, 2021).

According to Tamir, these operations were preceded by "very orderly and very didactic preparation," which built confidence in the ability of the forces to perform among the senior command levels that were required to approve them (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, 2020), among them Southern Command General Yoav Gallant, a veteran of Shayetet 13 (Lamm, 2008) and Chief of Staff Ashkenazi, who acknowledged their contribution since his days as a company commander in Golani “to the capabilities and self-confidence of the commanders” and their influence on the enemy (interview with G. Ashkenazi, February 21, 2021). Battalion commanders, including Yaron Finkelman from the Paratroopers (Harel, 2020) and David Zini from the Golani Brigade, then led raids across the fence in the Gaza Strip and struck terrorists in their territory (Pollak, 2015). These operations enabled the command, and through it to the General Staff, to accumulate knowledge, analyze Hamas’s strengths and weaknesses, and prepare accordingly for Operation Cast Lead.

Although the author notes in the book that the Southern Command and its then-commander Gallant carried "a great deal of weight in determining how the ground forces operate during the operation" (p. 273), he refrains from describing it in detail, as well as the process that preceded it—from the division to the command and to the General Staff. The successful result of the operation, Tamir stated, was "due to the combination of ground forces with air forces." They identified targets, he said, maneuvered with confidence, and hit enemy operatives (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, 2020).

Insights

The central and first component of the General Staff’s uniqueness, Finkel states, "is the strategic level that it oversees. Focusing on this level means a constant and systematic need for an up-to-date interpretation of reality, finding appropriate methodologies for developing a response to the new challenges, and establishing command and method mechanisms for IDF coordination and synchronization" (p. 461).

Moreover, the fact that the General Staff interfaces with the political echelon requires it to adopt its language as well as the language of the military—and the world and considerations of the political echelon are different from those of the military. "Building and maintaining a common language with the political echelon, especially if it changes, is a task that requires a variety of methods, such as discussions, visits, joint war simulations, and more" (p. 462).

The author made a good selection of test cases that describe the roles and challenges before the General Staff, noting that he was required to balance a range of tensions—chiefly the desire for maximum relevance versus the desire to produce cohesion between ranks and synchronization of efforts. For example, he notes the decision of Chief of Staff Dan Halutz during the Second Lebanon War to change the operational plan several times so as not to carry out an unsuitable plan. On the other hand, there is the attitude expressed by US General George Patton, considered one of the best generals in history, that "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week" (Hanson, 1999).

An additional tension is force buildup, as it is necessary to both preserve and improve the military’s competence for the challenges of the present on the one hand, and to implement modern means and try to shape the army for the challenges of the next decade on the other. An example, Finkel notes, can be seen in the short story "Superiority" by Arthur C. Clarke, in which "an attempt to develop advanced capability led to a temporary decline in effectiveness in comparison with the possibility of improving the old means, and to a defeat at the hands of an enemy that rapidly mass-produced less advanced capabilities" (p. 463).

The author points out that a decrease in the effectiveness of the IDF response could be catastrophic if war breaks out in the midst of updating the response. This applies to operational outlooks and operational plans that have not yet been implemented, and to weapons and advanced technological systems as well. Therefore, he writes, force buildup must be "based on flexibility, especially organizational-technological flexibility that includes components of balance, redundancy, versatility and the ability to change" (p. 464).

In the field of operational planning and in view of the fact that strategic context is changing rapidly, the author recommends the formulation of modular plans. Thus, in a limited campaign, Operation Cast Lead, for example, a plan that was originally intended to defeat the enemy fully can be only partially realized, while maintaining its relevance.

Missing from the Book

While an important and enlightening study, the book lacks up-to-date reference to the work of the General Staff vis-à-vis the political echelon, not only in the first three decades after the establishment of the state but in recent years, given Israel’s new threats and current challenges.

In the last two years, for example, much evidence has been published about the dialogue between the General Staff, headed by Chief of Staff Eisenkot, and the political echelon before Operation Northern Shield, until late in 2018, at Eisenkot’s initiative and with the approval of the political echelon, the IDF took surprise action and destroyed the Hezbollah tunnels on the Lebanese border (Farhi, 2020).

There is also a lack of reference in the book to the career path of the members of the General Staff and to the question of whether they were trained as necessary to act not only as commanders at the tactical level but also as commanders at the strategic level. In the IDF, most of the position holders (beginning at the rank of colonel) acquire the knowledge for their positions by on the job training, and the experience gained has enormous weight. Officers such as former Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yair Golan, who commanded a Paratroopers company and battalion in combat in Lebanon, and later a brigade and division, but also served in training positions and as head of the Operations section in the Operations Directorate; or Southern Command General Eliezer Toledano, who as an officer in the Paratroopers fought in the second intifada, commanded the elite Maglan unit in the 2006 war and raids in Gaza initiated by Brig. Gen. Tamir, and served as the Prime Minister’s military secretary (and therefore a member of the General Staff)—these officers did indeed go through a complete and varied service track, during which they gained experience both at the tactical and strategic levels. When the IDF designates commanders as having the potential for senior command, it is fitting that this approach constitute a guide for planning their career path.

Conclusion

Meir Finkel’s fascinating and comprehensive book is an important addition to an understanding of the role of the General Staff and its leader, its discourse with the political echelon, its responsibilities, the challenges it faces, processes, and role that have a tremendous impact on the entire country.

If in his previous book the author focused on the Chief of Staff, he has now made an in-depth analysis of the General Staff, which supports the Chief of Staff, learns, plans, and operates—in routine and in wartime—and of all of its various wings (planning, operational intelligence, logistics, and of course military districts).

In conclusion, it is worth recalling a statement by Gabi Ashkenazi while serving as deputy Chief of Staff, whereby the Chief of Staff is required to remember "the importance of the combatant echelon. They not only pay for our mistakes, they also correct them. Therefore, even today with all the budgetary difficulties, the lesson I’ve learned is—strengthen the combatant echelon!" (Channel 1, 2008). 

(Please refer to the original publication for the End Notes)

"War Month": A Test of the IDF’s Operational Concept and a Dress Rehearsal for the Next War | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

The IDF plans to conduct a month-long exercise, the first of its kind in Israel, which will simulate war in multiple arenas and multiple levels, and include elements of powerful offense and strong defense. The exercise will test, for the first time, Chief of Staff Kochavi’s ambitious operational concept for victory. What are the criteria for the exercise’s success?

The IDF announced recently that it would hold a "war month" in the first half of 2022 lasting four weeks – the first General Staff exercise of its kind. The exercise, which will include regular army and reserve forces on an especially large scale, is designed to evaluate the army's forces during the course of a long, consecutive, challenging, and life-like exercise in order to enhance readiness and fitness for war. The "war month" name is taken from the concluding stage in training IDF infantry troops. This phase includes a "war week" in which the training companies simulate a combat operation in order to test their fitness in an array of missions for which they were trained. In addition to a difficult and demanding drill involving many forces, the exercise will facilitate a thorough assessment of the operational concept for victory formulated by IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi.

Between August and September 1941, the US Army carried out a number of exercises in Louisiana over an area of 8,800 square kilometers. The exercises, in which the army wanted to test new concepts and weapons, such as the quality of commanders, was initiated by then-Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George Marshall, in order to strengthen and improve the army's readiness for taking part in the world war that began in 1939. It appeared then that at some point the United States would have to intervene in the war. The forces were divided into two armies (red and blue) of 200,000 soldiers each. During the exercise, these armies conducted maneuvers in which weapon systems such as tanks and new fighting frameworks were tested, among them the armored division commanded by General George Patton. The army had to develop a combat doctrine that would enable it to halt the German blitzkrieg, or alternatively, to move forces forward rapidly in order to exploit opportunities on the flanks and conduct attacks in a large area. In a briefing to his men before the maneuvers, Patton said, “Find the enemy, hold him, and get around him, always moving, do not sit down, do not say ‘I have done enough, ‘keep on, see what else you can do to raise the devil with the enemy…You must be desperate determination to go forward." The division under his command indeed demonstrated great mobility, and highlighted to the army commanders the advantage of large frameworks and mobility in armored forces.

The exercises also examined new ideas about integrated multi-corps and multi-branch battle management. Many of the lessons from these maneuvers became operational concepts of the US armed forces after the United States entered the war in December 1941. Furthermore, many of the commanders in those maneuvers, among them Omar Bradley, Mark Clark, Dwight Eisenhower, and of course George Patton, played prominent roles in the war and were appointed to key positions in the army in the campaign against Germany. The exercises, which were referred to as the Louisiana Maneuvers, became famous in the American ground forces, and are still regarded as a model for how innovative concepts and new weapons should be tested and evaluated.

It appears that like Marshall, IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi seeks to conduct an up-to-date version of the Louisiana Maneuvers. The IDF recently announced that in the first half of 2022, it would hold a "war month" lasting four weeks – the first General Staff exercise of its type. The exercise, which will include regular army and reserve forces on an especially large scale, is designed to evaluate the army's forces during the course of a long, consecutive, challenging, and life-like exercise in order to enhance its readiness and fitness for war.

"War month" is taken from the concluding phase of training IDF infantry troops, which includes a "war week," in which the training companies simulate a combat operation in order to test their fitness in an array of missions for which they were trained. It appears that the reason for the exercise is due primarily to the realization, as expressed by German General Erwin Rommel following his experiences as a company commander (and as an acting battalion commander) in an elite infantry battalion in WWI, "War makes extremely heavy demands on the soldier's strength and nerves. For this reason, make heavy demands on your men in peacetime exercises." In addition to a difficult and demanding drill involving many forces, the exercise will facilitate a thorough assessment of the operational concept for victory formulated by IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, aimed at "undermining the enemy’s approach and building military power that will prove to the enemy that its approach is no longer effective."

Kochavi's concept include three main efforts in the use of force, all of which are to be practiced during the "war month": a multi-dimensional maneuver for enemy territory, powerful attacks with firepower and cyberattacks, and a strong multidimensional defense, designed, as stated in an article by Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi, "so that the offensive achievements are not offset by the enemy's achievements in our territory." All of these efforts will be made simultaneously in order to expose the enemy and destroy it quickly.

Implementing the approach requires essential operational conditions, including intelligence superiority, air superiority, digital superiority, naval superiority, a policy that permits the effective use of firepower in the populated areas where the enemy hides and defends itself in the midst of the civilian population, the resilience of the home front during weeks of warfare, and operational continuity.

Key ideas in the approach are multi-branch efforts and multi-dimensionality, and according to the concept, all of the IDF's capabilities in all of the dimensions will be utilized in order to execute a more effective and deadlier maneuver and defense. For example, as US military theoretician and retired armored corps officer Douglas Macgregor said, sensors mounted on fighter jets and remote unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flying above the battlefield are likely to gather intelligence about the enemy in a specific location, which will be transmitted to the land or naval force, and actually to anyone can do the best job of destroying it. At the same time, the force utilizing electronic warfare can disrupt the enemy's drone operation designed to attack the maneuvering land force, and can provide that force with protection.

Furthermore, the goal of the maneuvering force is to influence the dimension in which it operates, and to influence that and other dimensions. For example, an armored force that destroys the enemy's rocket launchers or artillery will perform a land mission that affects the home front's ability to maintain operational continuity, while alternatively, an elite infantry force flown into enemy territory that gains control over areas where it can prevent land-based fire against the navy's ships will ensure naval freedom of action.

The new elements shaping the modern battlefield, including advanced technology and the ability to integrate and connect branches and forces more effectively, do not eliminate the need for maneuvering forces to conduct land-based warfare in enemy territory, sometimes at short range. The enemy is able to adjust to the firepower directed against it; prepare in advance, both above and below the surface; and continue fighting. As Patton said, flexible and fast maneuvering forces are therefore needed that will be able to find the enemy, expose it to firepower, and strike it directly in order to reduce the barrages fired at the Israel home front.

The planned IDF exercise will therefore include a scenario of an integrated multi-front campaign in the north and south, according to the up-to-date and gravest reference scenarios, as well as testing all of the necessary capabilities: the transition from peacetime to emergency, inter-organizational coordination, management of the home front and civilian assistance, use of firepower, maneuver in a built-up area, and approach to a civilian population in enemy territory. One key challenge for the IDF is conducting a large-scale maneuver at the front and deep in enemy territory, based on general staff capabilities and activity of special forces.

Like the Louisiana Maneuvers, "war month" delivers a warning message about enhancing readiness for an upcoming war. A divisional exercise is accordingly being added for the first time, in which the IDF Fire Formation (98th Paratroopers Division) and Depth Corps, commanded by ex-paratrooper Maj. Gen. Itai Veruv, will conduct maneuvers in Cyprus. The exercise also has a deterrent element – displaying the ability to transport a combat division quickly behind enemy lines in an air assault. Cyprus is topographically similar to the Lebanese mountains, and training in foreign territory with features similar to those of areas beyond Israel's borders in which Israel's forces are likely to fight is of great value. The airborne mission; movement and navigation in unfamiliar territory; handling pressure, fatigue, and forces simulating the enemy, all far from home, pose a real challenge to the commanders and forces. The exercise as a whole is designed to bolster a sense of capability and self-confidence, and to facilitate the advance and development of operational know-how and combat doctrine.

Large exercises that comprehensively assess the systematic fitness of the IDF and validate innovative concepts of warfare, while testing the fitness of the forces and the ability of the commanders to function under a heavy load for an extended period, have considerable advantages. At the same time, given the current uncertain state of the IDF's resources resulting from the political crisis, the absence of an up-to-date state budget, and the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, budgetary issues arise. The alternative cost of the exercise and the constraints imposed by an exercise lasting an entire month on the IDF's operational continuity in a range of areas, from counter-terrorism and regular security in the Palestinian theater to the war between wars in the north, must be taken into consideration.

Another question is the degree to which the new operational concept is assimilated. One of the causes of the failures in the war between the IDF and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 was that the operational concept formulated before the war was not properly assimilated by the IDF forces. Nevertheless, the "war month" will provide the IDF with a period long enough to assimilate the current concept and its derivatives, and improve the expertise of forces and their commanders. A thorough assessment will make it possible to draw conclusions and update the concept in time for the next campaign.

The challenge facing the IDF is to learn lessons from the “war month” and the campaigns in which it fought against hybrid semi-military organizations, from the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge until the current time, so that victory is achieved in the next campaign in a shorter period. This will be an expression of the profound change that has occurred in the IDF.

The Operational Environment: Possible Escalation to an Unwanted War | by Itai Brun and Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

Israel’s enemies are deterred from large-scale conflict • Possible unwanted escalation in the north and south • In a war Israel will sustain a severe attack on the home front, an incursion into its territory, and a cognitive campaign

The complex and challenging operational environment where Israel employs its military force (along with other measures) represents the convergence of technological, military, social, and political developments that emerged over recent decades. These developments include: deep, global changes in the nature of war; geostrategic changes in the Middle East, most of which are connected to the consequences of the regional upheaval and the ensuing events (including the arrival of Russian and US military forces in the region); substantial changes in the operational doctrine and weapons of Israel’s enemies, especially those that belong to the radical Shiite axis; changes in how Israeli military force is employed, and the preference for firepower (based on precise intelligence) over ground force maneuvers; and the consequences of the information revolution that has shaken the world, including the military institutions.

From Isolated Battle Days to Escalation?

In 2020 Israeli deterrence of large-scale conflict and war remained clearly in force, and even seems to have grown stronger. Israel’s enemies recognize its strength, and they are preoccupied with their domestic problems, including the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. A series of war games held by INSS in late 2019 and early 2020, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, led to the conclusion that all of the actors in the northern arena wish to avoid escalation. The year 2020 validated this assessment, and indeed, escalation did not occur. The experience of the last few years shows that this is also the case with regard to forces in the Gaza Strip.

However, since last July, the Northern Command has been on a higher level of alert with respect to Hezbollah, following Hezbollah’s threat to respond to the strike attributed to Israel in Syria in which one of the organization’s operatives was killed. The organization tried several times to settle the score with Israel, but was unsuccessful. The IDF repelled all of the attempts and even continued its attacks in Syria, in a way that made it clear that it does not accept the deterrence equations composed by Hezbollah.

In Israel, as in the ranks of Hamas and Hezbollah, there is an awareness of the danger inherent in an escalation dynamic, but it seems that all of the sides expect that they can end it after a few days of battle, similar to the short conflicts in the Gaza arena in recent years. However, such a scenario could change if one or both of the sides suffers fatal losses, at which point response and counter-response could escalate and lead to large-scale conflict and even war. Such a war could occur with the Iranian-Shiite axis, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, and perhaps even with Iran itself. Furthermore, the escalation could spill over into other arenas, in particular with the forces in the Gaza Strip.

The Enemy’s Operational Doctrine

Hezbollah and Hamas’s choice regarding their current form of warfare stems from learning processes that took place starting in the 1990s, based on an analysis of Israel’s strengths and weaknesses. Last year INSS pointed to a change in these organizations’ doctrine of warfare following lessons learned from the conflicts that developed with Israel since the Second Lebanon War (2006). The essence of this change is the transition from a victory concept based on wearing down the Israeli population (“victory via non-defeat”) to a concept that also seeks to damage, from various arenas, national infrastructure in Israel and essential military capabilities, in order to destabilize and undermine the Israeli system.

This concept is implemented by means of military buildup processes that include: increasing the number of rockets and missiles, both in order to improve the survivability of the arsenal and to saturate the Israeli air defense systems; arming with high-precision rockets and missiles that can hit vulnerable civilian facilities (electricity, gas, and other national infrastructure) and military weak points (air force bases and headquarters) in Israel; arming with drones and other unmanned aerial aircraft, including for the purposes of precision strikes.

This concept is also based on the idea of infiltrating ground forces into Israeli territory, in order to disrupt the IDF’s offensive and defensive operational capabilities and to increase the damage to the home front’s stamina. Against this backdrop, the abilities of Hezbollah and Hamas to penetrate into Israeli territory have been improved, including in the underground realm, via special raid forces (Hezbollah’s Radwan force and Hamas’s Nukhba force). These forces are intended for moving some of the fighting into Israeli territory – taking central roads, infiltrating communities and bases, and compelling the IDF to invest a significant portion of its efforts in defense – in effect preventing it from being able to go on the offensive. Hamas has invested significant efforts and resources, both material and personnel, in its offensive tunneling project. In October the IDF exposed and destroyed an especially deep border fence crossing tunnel that was located using the engineering barrier capabilities built along the border between Gaza and Israel. It seems that Hamas has not abandoned the project since the construction of the barrier, and intends to find ways to overcome the obstacle.

The IDF Operational Doctrine

An examination of public official IDF documents published during the past year reveals a great deal about the concept of the IDF operational method in the next campaign. Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi and the entire General Staff see the response as a combination of "multidimensional maneuver into enemy territory, offensive strikes using firepower and other dimensions, and strong multidimensional defense. All of these will be carried out together, will benefit from closer reciprocity, and will fully utilize their advantages in the air, on the ground, in intelligence, and in information processing in order to expose the hidden enemy and destroy it at a fast pace".

Along with investing in enemy exposure capabilities and increasing fire effort capacities (with an emphasis on precision fire), the IDF has invested efforts in the ground forces in order to make ground maneuver more lethal, faster, and more flexible. In addition, the IDF has invested in constructing an engineered barrier, both on the northern border and in the southern arena, with the aim of thwarting the offensive tunneling efforts by Hamas and Hezbollah.

Regarding firepower, with an emphasis on airpower, the IDF has developed its strike doctrine on a large scale and with great precision, with each such strike aiming to cause the enemy destruction and damage that will exceed its expectations regarding the IDF’s capabilities and intentions. These strikes will be directed toward hitting enemy systems that it defines as critical to its operational functioning and to implementation of its strategy. There are three kinds of strikes: spatial strikes, whose goal is to hit a maximum number of the enemy’s operatives, infrastructure, and weapons in a given sector; mission-oriented strikes, whose goal is to destroy a specific enemy system (long-range rockets, for example); and broad strikes, whose goal is to hit a series of systems and spaces in order to cause the enemy to suffer multi-system failure and force it to invest most of its efforts in defense and repair of the destruction it has suffered. The goal of neutralizing warfare capabilities focuses on the enemy’s rocket arsenal, with an emphasis on the precision long-range missile arsenal, along with the operatives in its penetration forces.

Regarding ground maneuvers, in recent years two main gaps have emerged according to the IDF’s assessment, both in its ability to meet the challenge of high-trajectory fire in different arenas, and in the ability to deny capabilities in the enemy’s centers of gravity quickly and continuously. Thus, the army formulated an up-to-date doctrine for ground maneuvers that aims to address these gaps and sees maneuver warfare as a multidimensional process. In the ground forces, the maneuver doctrine has been formulated emphasizing consolidation, exposure, assembly, strike, and assault, whereby the maneuvering forces will be provided with intelligence capabilities and enhanced enemy exposure capabilities. This is so that they can attack the enemy and neutralize its capabilities, through both precision fire and rapid and lethal maneuvers. The IDF prioritization of firepower remains, but it is evident that in the past five years the understanding has emerged that launching fast and aggressive maneuvers as a complementary step is essential for quickly ending the campaign, under conditions that will serve Israel’s interests. Accordingly, considerable resources have been invested in improving and strengthening the capabilities of the maneuvering forces.

The Nature of the Next War

The IDF must prepare for two main campaign scenarios that could develop from unwanted escalation following limited battle days in the northern arena: a "third Lebanon war" with only Hezbollah in Lebanon that would be much more intense and destructive than the Second Lebanon War; and a "first northern war" with Hezbollah in Lebanon, but also with forces in Syria and Iraq, and perhaps also in Iran and in additional arenas.

In a war, the IDF would employ its offensive capabilities – on the ground, in the air, and at sea – and would cause very extensive damage to its enemies, in the front and deep behind enemy lines. But in such a war Israel too is expected to face massive surface-to-surface missile fire on the home front, some of which would be precision missiles and some of which would even penetrate the air defense systems. There would be attacks on the home front by unmanned aerial vehicles and drones; the penetration of ground forces into Israeli territory on the level of thousands of fighters; and cyber and cognitive attacks intended to undermine the stamina of the Israeli public and its faith in the political and military leadership. The IDF’s offensive components would face sophisticated air and sea defense systems and complex ground defense systems, including the use of the underground realm and advanced anti-tank missiles.

The campaign could therefore take place on two different levels: on one, Israel’s enemies would attack the home front with high-trajectory fire in amounts not previously seen, and in the other Israel would attack the enemy’s forces in its territory, through firepower and through ground maneuvers. But it is possible that the impression will emerge of only a loose connection between the two levels. Given the destruction in Israel’s cities, Israel’s residents who will be under fire will not be overly impressed by the enormous destruction that the IDF will inflict on the enemy’s systems (even if they are located within a civilian population) and by the number of its operatives who are struck in the battles. Battalion commanders in the Second Lebanon War said that during the fighting, despite lapses and errors, they felt that they carried out their mission and won overall, and when they returned to Israel they discovered that the public thought that the achievement lay somewhere between a tie and a loss. Considering the expected damage in the next war, this feeling will intensify.

Furthermore, presumably the reserve forces that are called up will also be forced to organize under fire, as the recruitment bases and emergency storage units will be targeted. The army will not be able to implement its "precious time" doctrine, whereby during a conflict the reserve units go through training to increase their fitness and only then take part in the fighting, because the training areas will also be targeted (as they were in 2012, during Operation Pillar of Defense in the southern arena). Moreover, because some of the bases of reserve units are located far from the front lines, transporting the forces could be delayed due to high trajectory fire by the enemy. Hence, the safest place that the fighting forces can be is at the front and in the depths of enemy territory. While the ground forces will have to cope with the risks of fighting there, their combat capabilities and strength will address these risks.

The Israeli public expects a military victory in a short campaign with few losses. This expectation grows when it comes to a campaign based on the use of airpower. However, in future conflicts it is expected that the air force squadrons will not be able to move almost freely over enemy territory, as was demonstrated in February 2018, when, during an Israeli air strike in Syria, an F-16 fighter jet was hit and its pilots were forced to abandon the aircraft over the Jezreel Valley. Furthermore, along with its anti-aircraft systems, the enemy will seek to damage the functional continuity of the Israeli Air Force by firing rockets and missiles at air bases. The IDF will need to struggle for air superiority and freedom of operation. Moreover, the Russian presence in the northern arena could place additional limitations on the air force’s freedom of operation.

Policy Recommendations

Israel must prepare for a multi-theater war (a "northern war") as a main reference threat. This war would be characterized by a higher intensity than the campaigns that it has waged since the Second Lebanon War, both in terms of the amount of fire on the Israeli home front and in terms of the fighting front.

Given the challenges expected for airpower and the need to curtail fire on the home front quickly, it is important to prepare the ground forces for flexible, aggressive, and lethal maneuvers to destroy the enemy’s military force. In addition, it is important to narrow the gaps between public expectations regarding the nature and possible results of the war and the expected reality, and to initiate a political and military effort to prevent war and make the most of other alternatives for advancing Israel’s objectives in the northern arena. Furthermore, a multi-year plan for the IDF should be finalized and budgeted, and adapted to the budgetary constraints forced by the COVID-19 crisis. The buildup as part of the American aid should be implemented, and the IDF and the defense forces should be removed from the political struggle in Israel.

The Next War Will Make No Allowances for Political or Covid Constraints | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

"Prepare for it as if it will happen tomorrow", instructed IDF Chief of Staff Kochavi at a large-scale exercise in the north, and reminded commanders what perhaps the Knesset has forgotten: on Israel’s northern border, the quiet can be deceptive. Israel’s lawmakers must rise to the occasion, remove security issues from the healthcare and political crises, and help advance IDF readiness for the next campaign, before it is too late

  • originally published as an "INSS Insight" No. 1412, December 7, 2020

The prolonged tension in the north between the IDF and Hezbollah suggests that the two sides are actually only a few faulty or miscalculated moves away from a clash that is liable to escalate rapidly into a full-scale war, with little warning that would give the IDF time to prepare. At the same time, Israel is grappling with a Covid-19 crisis and a prolonged political crisis that has delayed essential IDF force buildup processes, particularly the budget and procurement of aircraft and battle systems, as well as the IDF's training program. The political crisis has also disrupted the ongoing dialogue between the government and the army, which is a critical element in Israel's ability to make decisions on both force buildup and, no less importantly, on force application. Despite the pandemic and the political crisis – and as was underscored recently by the IDF's retaliatory operation in Syria in response to the explosives laid in the Golan Heights – the IDF should train and prepare for escalation, despite the risks of infection from the coronavirus, so that it will be ready for war.

In mid-November 2020, the IDF reported it had launched a large-scale air attack in Syria. As described by the IDF spokesperson, the attack was in retaliation for explosives laid close to Outpost 116 in the Golan Heights under the direction of Unit 840 of the Iranian al-Quds force, which uses Syrian volunteers in terrorist operations. The IDF struck eight targets, including weapons stores, ground-to-air missile batteries, an al-Quds headquarters, and the headquarters of the Syrian 7th division. A number of Syrian and Iranian soldiers were killed in this attack. Since last July, the IDF Northern Command has been on increased alert against Hezbollah, following an attack in Syria attributed to Israel in which a Hezbollah operative was killed.

Following the latter attack, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declared that the organization would exact a price in human life for each Hezbollah operative killed in Lebanon or Syria. Hezbollah has tried a number of times to impose this equation on Israel, with no success. For example, in August, Hezbollah snipers fired at an IDF force on the Lebanese border near Manara. The IDF responded from the air, attacking Hezbollah positions near the Lebanese border (in contrast to the response in a previous event, when a squad of Hezbollah snipers crossed the border at Mount Dov, and the IDF allowed the Hezbollah squad to flee). Maj. Gen. Amir Baram, head of the IDF Northern Command and a former paratrooper, said that the Israeli attack was designed to show Hezbollah that "you lost two positions when you fired and caused no casualties. This shows you how we will respond to a shooting attack that causes casualties". A number of additional attacks against bases of Iranian forces in Syria were attributed to Israel – a signal to Nasrallah that his equation has not deterred Israel. The tension, however, has not abated, and Nasrallah has since repeated, and emphasized, that the price will be exacted.

Although the tension continues at a low level, as has occurred in the past on both the southern and northern fronts, the two sides are only a few steps away from escalation that might develop into a war. As with the Israel-Hamas dynamic, it appears that Israel and Hezbollah have adopted the approach that any escalation will be limited to a few days of battle that can be contained and controlled. The potential damage from escalation on the northern front, however, is far greater than the potential damage that Hamas can inflict on Israel. This could make it even more difficult for Israel and Hezbollah to control developments and prevent their escalation into a major conflict.

In addition to the ongoing tension, any assessment of Israel's strategic position should factor in additional variables, among them the forthcoming transition in United States administrations. An American attack on Iranian targets in the region is possible, either in response to attacks against US forces in Iraq and eastern Syria or in order to damage Iran's nuclear project. Such an attack is likely to spark an Iranian response against Israel utilizing Iranian proxies, at a time when Israel continues to weather the Covid-19 pandemic and a political crisis.

Israel is a strong country, with stable and functioning government systems. The political stalemate in the decision making process, however, including in defense matters, has a negative impact on the defense establishment's preparedness for escalation in the security situation. No budget has been drafted or approved in the six months since the current government was formed, including for the defense budget. Procurement of new combat systems and weapons has not yet been decided, and the Tnufa (Momentum) multi-year plan proposed by IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi has not yet been approved. As stated by Ministry of Defense director general Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Eshel, adaptation of the processes of training, procurement, receiving, and absorbing new combat systems and aircraft takes time, and some of Israel’s aircraft, for example helicopters, are in operational service far longer than what the manufacturer intended.

Furthermore, as revealed in the course of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's trip to Saudi Arabia and the political process that led to the signing of the Abraham Accords, senior ministers and the IDF General Staff were excluded and did not take part in the preparations, or in the process itself. A proper, regular, and ongoing dialogue between the government and the army is a vital element in Israel's ability to make critical defense decisions on force buildup, and no less importantly, on the use of force. In the event of escalation on the northern front, the ability of army commanders and senior political leaders to conduct a quick and well-organized dialogue based on trust and knowledge is essential for Israel's ability to manage such escalation successfully.

Given this situation, the insistence of Chief of Staff Kochavi on carrying out essential parts of the Tnufa program, as well as conducting Lethal Arrow, a multi-system exercise, which in late October simulated a conflict on more than one front and included participation by reserve forces, is praiseworthy. In addition to this drill, regular army and reserve forces conducted additional exercises, and more drills are scheduled to take place in the coming months.

Israel's airpower comprises effective and lethal force capable of especially large attack output. The air force has formulated a concept of large-scale high-precision strikes in which each strike is designed to cause destruction and damage to the enemy far in excess of its expectations of the IDF's capabilities and intentions. These strikes are planned to damage enemy systems that are critical to its operational performance and strategic plans. The objective is to bring about multi-system failure, thereby forcing the enemy to devote most of its resources to defense and reconstruction.

At the same time, it is quite possible that in addition to airpower, Israel will have to conduct supplementary rapid and aggressive land operations against enemy soldiers in their territory that will unseat them physically and emotionally, and will also expose targets to attack with precise firepower. According to the IDF, ground maneuvers in recent years revealed two main problems: the ability to provide a response to rocket and missile fire aimed at the Israeli home front, and the ability to neutralize capabilities, rapidly and continuously, in the enemy's centers of gravity. The IDF ground forces have therefore devised a ground combat doctrine of buildup, detection, convergence, strike, and assault, in which the ground combat forces have access to enhanced intelligence and detection capabilities. This will enable them to locate the enemy, attack it, and neutralize its capabilities through precise firepower and rapid and deadly action by land forces.

In any case, the large areas in Lebanon and the densely populated urban areas in the Gaza Strip require large orders of battle, and certainly in a multi-front war. This mandates the use of reserve forces, because the regular army by itself will not be sufficient. In turn, this points to the third deficiency in IDF preparedness – the combat fitness of its forces. Making the IDF fit for combat on land, despite the constraints, requires combat exercises, lest Israel find itself with an inadequate response to the threat. In a talk with Paratroopers Brigade commanders before the exercise in the Galilee, Chief of Staff Kochavi said, "It is impossible to triumph over our enemies without land operations." He warned against the illusion that the next campaign would be far in the future, and told the commanders that they should "prepare for it as if it will happen tomorrow".

In addition to a high level of readiness, regular maneuvers on a reasonably high level have always been a challenge to the IDF, because the IDF has almost constantly faced concrete threats. Conducting training during the Covid-19 pandemic, however, is an especially difficult challenge, because the possibility of infection during exercises has been added to the usual constraints affecting reserve soldiers, led by their need to balance between employment and family needs on the one hand and service in the IDF reserves on the other. Concern about contagion is well founded, as people have been infected during training.

Nevertheless, as the Chief of Staff said, Israel's enemies will have no regard for its Covid-19 or political constraints. The IDF must therefore arrange a clear procedure as soon as possible that will include appropriate compensation for soldiers who become ill and those who are forced to quarantine as a result of reserve service, and must insist on conducting drills. This arrangement will make it clear to soldiers serving in the reserves that the IDF regards them as a vital asset, and will reinforce their trust in it, while making them realize the importance of training. Conducting combat exercises, combined with IDF-initiated offensive action on the various fronts, strengthens Israel's deterrent image and clearly demonstrates its readiness for war, even though it does not wish for one.

In conclusion, despite the prevailing assumption that the probability of war at the present time is low, especially before the new administration settles into office in the US, it is essential to maintain the IDF's fitness and preparedness for unexpected developments, especially those involving the Iranian-Shiite axis on the northern front, which includes Lebanon, Syria, and western Iraq. The IDF's role is that of a responsible adult – especially at this time, when the political decision making and governmental mechanisms in Israel are underperforming. A high level of preparedness and a high and prominent operational profile will help deter the Shiite axis from efforts to confront Israel with harsh defense challenges having the potential to escalate into a large scale conflict.

An IDF Multi-Year Plan for the Ground Forces | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

As part of the economic crisis facing Israel, the IDF too is expected to face budget cuts. When the army is forced to make budgetary changes, it must remember: there is no substitute for the capabilities of ground forces, and failure to maintain them could have a very costly outcome

  • originally published  as an "INSS Insight" No. 1344, July 12, 2020

In a recent speech, IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi said that even during the coronavirus crisis, "the IDF continued to prevent and uproot threats", and to provide Israel with security and stability. This activity, he stated, is likely to be taken for granted, because of the "defense paradox: when there is security tranquility and stability, people are inclined to forget how difficult it is to achieve them", and they make the mistake of thinking that spending on defense needs can be reduced. The Chief of Staff warned that many countries, including Israel, have committed this error and subsequently paid a heavy price. His remarks were apparently in response to the economic recession in light of the coronavirus crisis. In view of the economic and budgetary distress, it is likely that all government ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, will be asked to accept smaller budgets. However, a smaller defense budget is liable to impact negatively on the army's capability, and particularly the ability of the ground forces, to provide effective security in peacetime and in an emergency, especially in war.

What sort of campaign is the most important? Is it the ongoing campaign between wars, which in part is designed to prevent war, or is war itself the principal campaign? Is the IDF's primary task to continue its force buildup and improve readiness in preparation for full-scale war? In today’s region, the opposing sides will usually prefer to stay below the threshold of full-scale war. On the other hand, there are situations that feature a chain of successive responses by the two sides with unforeseen consequences that are likely to culminate in escalation or even war. The IDF must therefore maintain its readiness for both the campaign between wars and for all-out war. 

Before the Second Lebanon War, for example, the ground forces’ fitness was severely affected by the 2003 budget cut. However, the theory was that the ongoing intensive operations against Palestinian terrorism would preserve the army's operational readiness. This misconception ignored the fact that fighting terrorism is different from what is likely to occur in a campaign like the one in Lebanon. Indeed, the "less than satisfactory" way, as a senior IDF officer put it, that that ground forces operated in the Second Lebanon War demonstrated that neglecting their fitness was a costly decision. The conclusion is that training the ground army for the purpose of maintaining battle fitness for an emergency requires the continuous investment of resources. This conclusion is also supported by the lessons of Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip in 2014, which highlighted the same dilemma, although in a less severe way. The fact that almost the entire regular army taking part in maneuvers fought in this operation was also due to the unfitness of the reserve forces, which did not undergo the necessary training and required a long time to make them combat ready.

There were good explanations for the cuts in both of these cases. The second intifada and the economic crisis on the one hand, and the 2011 social protests on the other, resulted in a decision to cut the defense budget. The IDF, most of whose budget is inflexible and tied to payment of salaries and pensions, regular maintenance, procurement, and force buildup projects, makes cuts where it can, usually in training, based on how it assesses the risk of war.

While the value ascribed to the ground maneuver, which requires a major logistics endeavor and almost always includes casualties, faded, the importance of firepower (mostly precision, but not exclusively) rose. The reasons are obvious: airpower, for example, is available for immediate and defined action on the other side of the border, and its use falls below the war threshold. Airpower makes full use of Israel's technological and military supremacy, and utilizes precision-guided weaponry, which reduces the risk to IDF forces and uninvolved civilians.

The IDF currently possesses very effective firepower and intelligence capabilities for combined operations, and the air force is capable of attacking thousands of targets a day. These capabilities were highly impressive against the threat posed by Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2014. Then too, however, precision firepower, boosted by timely and accurate intelligence, was not enough. The enemy became accustomed to it and learned to evade it, while continuing to launch missiles and rockets at the Israeli home front. The ground maneuver and firepower did not stop the barrages against the Israeli home front, but they did disrupt and lessen them. The combination of the two is capable of bringing the campaign to a close and leading to a situation in which Israel will be able to force its terms on its enemies – a state of affairs that Israel will seek to maintain for as long as possible.

The use of firepower is essential. It injures and disrupts the enemy's operational capabilities, deprives it of strategic assets, inflicts severe and destructive damage, deters it from another campaign for years, and forces it to invest its resources in repairing the damage. On the other hand, Israel cannot afford the luxury of prolonged campaigns because of the threat to its home front posed by the enemy. Although the fighting should not be halted before Israel's firepower is used in the attacks, Israel should aim at shortening the campaign's duration as much as possible. One of the tools available to the IDF to shorten the campaign is the ground maneuver, because it poses a concrete threat to the enemy's survival and ability to function, and is likely to cause it to terminate the campaign.

What this means is that the army needs supplementary land capability, including regular and reserve forces that can be called up and used as a spearhead in a lightning land campaign that will disable and damage the military power of Hezbollah and Hamas. A ground force composed of combined combat teams smaller in size than those of the IDF's past traditional and awkward structure is needed. The old structure relied mainly on divisions as combat teams. What is needed are brigade-size forces able to move rapidly from theater to theater and conduct raids with speed, flexibility, and tight inter-branch coordination, integrating elements of firepower and intelligence, while initiating direct contact with enemy operatives and conducting effective attacks against them. These forces, which will be based on the ability to process intelligence rapidly, will be able to track down an elusive enemy that makes every effort to avoid direct contact with the army by staying protected in tunnels and bunkers.

The IDF’s most recent successful land campaigns were in Operation Defensive Shield, when Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi commanded the Paratroopers Brigade, and Operation Cast Lead, when he was head of the Operations Division of the Operations Directorate. It appears that this experience taught him that a land campaign should aim to destroy the enemy's assets and military power. In his view, "If all you did was reach a certain line without destroying the rockets, anti-tank missiles, and headquarters on the way, the enemy entrenched in the urban area will continue operating as if the land operation or counterattack had no effect on it".

Even in a campaign initiated by the IDF with powerful and impressive firepower, targets lower their signature within a short time, and the enemy vanishes from the battlefield. In order to track down the enemy, attack it, and bring it to the surface, so that it can be hit with a barrage of firepower, ground maneuver and direct contact with the enemy's strongholds and hiding places are necessary.

The IDF must now undergo force buildup processes that address a range of scenarios – some of which are already evident – including annexation in the West Bank, a second wave of the coronavirus, an economic recession accompanied by a deep cut in the defense budget, and, as always, the possibility of an outbreak of unrest in the West Bank or a conflict in the Gaza Strip and the northern theater (and possibly both). The multi-year plan will have to create optimal readiness in the army for the various scenarios, while setting in motion force buildup processes for the future and cutting some portions of the budget. Therefore, it would be a mistake to devote most of the investment to intelligence and firepower capabilities, at the cost of preparedness and buildup of ground forces.

The previous multi-year plan, "Gideon", which was carried out during the term of former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, emphasized preparedness of the ground forces, "our Achilles’ heel", as described by Major General Aharon Haliva. During Eisenkot's term, training of ground forces increased; substantive reform was conducted in the ground forces arm, in which tens of thousands of unneeded soldiers were discharged from reserve duty; and a distinction was made in the fitness of units, with priority being given to the combat brigades, even at the expense of force buildup and procurement. In addition, the IDF's ability to operate deep in enemy territory was upgraded through the establishment of a commando brigade. The political deadlock of the past year, however, which prevented the creation of a regular budget framework and caused a cut in training (exacerbated by the coronavirus crisis), means that the Achilles’ heel is still a weak point.

By nature, armies are conservative organizations. The fear that the army will have to engage in combat before the change is complete means that the processes of change will be relatively slow, but these must be persistent. Another variable is the inherent tension in force buildup processes between the desire to improve weak points and the desire to strengthen the IDF's relative advantage. The difficulty in strengthening the ground forces stems from the size of this arm in manpower, combat platforms, and equipment. The cost of consolidating a quality effect is larger and more substantial that that required for procuring precision weapons. The result is that the army will usually choose to strengthen its qualitative advantage. On the other hand, the fact that the regular and reserve land army is shrinking as time goes by makes it possible to strengthen its strike forces, as was done under the Gideon plan.

Because of the expected defense budget cut, the next multi-year plan, "Tnufa" ("Momentum"), should build the most suitable plan for Israel and the challenges before it, and should in effect continue the previous multi-year plan. The threat from both the Gaza Strip and the northern front, which includes a grave threat to the home front from batteries of rockets and missiles and raiding forces designed to penetrate and operate in Israeli territory, requires making the ground forces much quicker, more flexible, and capable of operating on both defense and offense. This joins the necessary enhancement of firepower capabilities and their lethalness.

Some of the measures were indeed taken over the past year. In the IDF Southern Command and Northern Command, Major Generals Herzi Halevi and Amir Baram, both originally from the Paratroopers, initiated a series of training maneuvers and threshold tests, so that all the regular and reserve IDF battalions undergo training simulating a campaign in the south and the north. These training maneuvers are important, because, as the Chief of Staff said, "If there is something significant to combat soldiers crossing the border, it is a sense of capability and confidence". Although the test of fitness is a step in the right direction, a major investment must still be made in the ground forces, because the combination of firepower and an effective and energetic land campaign can shorten the duration of the next conflict, and also achieve a decisive outcome. 

Hezbollah in crisis, but Israel cannot take its eyes off it | By Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

The plague hit Lebanon during an ongoing economic crisis. The dire situation of both countries has had a profound effect on Hezbollah, the terrorist organization that is supported by Iran

Published in "The Jerusalem Post", April 19, 2020

IDF Spokesman Brig.-Gen. Hidai Zilberman recently told reporters that the corona pandemic had hit hard in some of the region’s countries and there was “a decline in hostile activity toward Israel". The severe outbreak of the disease in Iran has reduced the volume of its military activity against Israel as regards the supplying of weapons and financing of terrorism.

The plague hit Lebanon during an ongoing economic crisis. The dire situation of both countries has had a profound effect on Hezbollah, the terrorist organization that is supported by Iran and which is an integral part of the Lebanese government.

In an article published by researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies, Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer state, "In these circumstances there is heightened pressure on Hezbollah, which is responsible for the appointment of the current minister of health".

Mizrahi and Schweitzer recommended that "the IDF should continue to use the opportunity to strike Hezbollah forces in Syria and disrupt their efforts to bring weapons into Lebanon". The IDF, it seems, agreed with the assessment of the two. According to foreign publications, the Israeli Air Force recently carried out a series of strikes in Syria, some to prevent the organization from obtaining long-range guided missiles, and some against the "Golan File" unit that Hezbollah has established on the Golan Heights.

An epidemic or not, since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah stars at the top of the threat scenarios table prepared by the IDF. The man who worries the most is the commander of the IDF’s Northern Command, Maj.-Gen. Amir Baram.

Last February, Baram spoke at a conference held in memory of Paratroopers Brigade Reconnaissance (Sayeret Tzanhanim) company commander, Maj. Eitan Balachsan, who was killed in a skirmish with Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon in 1999.

Baram said at the conference that he and Balachsan "met many times throughout the service in Lebanon, as young commanders in the paratroopers". He was also the man called to take command of the company after its commander was killed.

The man who recommended to call him was the commander of the brigade to which Balachsan belonged, along with Baram’s company commander when he joined the paratroopers’ anti-tank company, Aviv Kochavi (Now the IDF chief of staff).

Indeed, despite the severe blow to the company, Baram again made it a leading operational unit. A few months later, Baram led a force from the company in a tangled operation in Lebanon. The result was two Hezbollah operatives killed.

The next time Baram was operating in the Lebanese sector was when he commanded the elite Maglan unit (before that he was my battalion commander in the Paratroopers Brigade). Although most of the activity during those years was in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, Baram pushed to activate the unit also against Hezbollah.

IN JUNE 2005, a force from the unit, commanded by Itamar Ben-Haim, also a Paratroopers Brigade officer (and now commander of the Hebron Brigade), ambushed three Hezbollah operatives on Mount Dov. BenHaim’s force killed the squad commander who took part, it turned out, in the ambush in which Balachsan was killed. The other two operatives fled, and one was wounded.

The death of the squad commander has had a profound effect on Hezbollah’s senior command in the area. In an after-action report, Baram wrote, "Hezbollah also has faces and names. It’s not a demon that comes out of the ground, for whom the people are also dear. Wounded and dead are extremely difficult for them".

Since 2005, the IDF has fought two campaigns against Hezbollah; one in the summer of 2006, and one secret, long and Sisyphean. Former IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen Gadi Eisenkot described at the time dealing with Hezbollah as "a huge iceberg, some of which is visible to the public and media eye, and the greater part is hidden from view".

The prime example is the organization’s flagship project: the penetration tunnels dug in the northern border, which the IDF surprisingly destroyed in Operation Northern Shield. At the conference, Baram said that despite the Lebanese government’s claims that Hezbollah does not share its decisions, it is “two sides of the same coin".

The Lebanese president pledged in an interview to the French media that Hezbollah obeyed UN resolution 1701, which at the time ended the Second Lebanon War and included the deployment of an armed UN and the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from continuing to operate from there.

"But what they say in French does not happen on the ground in Arabic," said the Northern Command’s general, noting that the organization, sponsored by the Lebanese state, “violently violates the decision".

As examples, he brought military activity in Shi’ite villages in southern Lebanon and the organization’s striving to equip itself with long-range, high-precision missiles with the aim of damaging the Israeli home front.

In his speech, Baram warned, "If we are to fight, we will know how to claim a heavy price from this organization and those who sponsor it; also from its patrons in the northeast, also from the capital of the Lebanese state in Beirut, and certainly from the Shi’ite villages in southern Lebanon, which serve as a shelter and base for Hezbollah’s terrorist forces".

The IDF, like Israel as a whole, is now facing a pandemic. The 98th Paratroopers Division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Yaron Finkelman, who had previously commanded the Paratroopers Reconnaissance Battalion in Operation Cast Lead and the Givati Brigade, was deployed to Bnei Brak, as part of an effort to stop the severe outbreak of the epidemic that was discovered in before it can expand into wider circles outside the city.

That makes a lot of sense, since it’s a flexible and portable power, but the 98th Division is the sharpened tip of the IDF Ground Forces for war. In the next round against Hezbollah, it is a significant tool in the IDF’s offensive ability that the commander of the Northern Command spoke of, through rapid, deadly and flexible ground maneuvers at the front and behind enemy lines. In order to be ready for war the day after the coronavirus subsides, the IDF will be required to regain its now-defunct combat capabilities.

Hezbollah was at a low level in the past, during difficult times in the Syrian civil war and after the Second Lebanon War. But even when it was down, Hezbollah refused to give up the fight in Israel. Today the IDF is focusing its efforts close to home, investing resources, troops and tools in finding solutions to the plague. But it would be best to look to the future, too, because the plague will finally pass, and Hezbollah is here to stay.

 

Potential for strategic turns | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

The killing of soleimani and the Deal fo the Century

In the 13th International Conference of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) was concluded with a conversation between the institute’s head, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, and Maj.-Gen. Aharon Haliva, head of the IDF Operations Directorate. The two talked about the IDF’s force buildup, and about the challenges the army faces in the present and future.

Haliva was asked how the IDF copes with the presence of Iranian forces in Syria, given that the rate of IDF strikes in Syria has decreased and Iranians are moving their operations to countries where it’s more complex for the IDF to operate, Iraq and Lebanon.

"The Persians did invent chess, but I met quite a few Jews who learned how to deliver checkmate", replied Haliva, noting that the campaign-between-the-wars is far from over.

"The IDF has continued in the last year, with all the power and tools. Most of them are hidden from the eye… to prevent Iranian consolidation in the area", he said. But there are, he added, other interests and players to consider, including the Russians and the Americans.

In his view, "both the killing of [Gen. Qasem] Soleimani by the United States in early January, as well as the announcement of the "Deal of the Century" are two events with significant potential for strategic turns, and the IDF is preparing for it".

Yadlin, a former fighter pilot who took part in the strike that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and who served as the head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, noted that in light of the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Iran could “crawl” toward nuclear weapons production.

Asked whether the IDF is ready to deal with that threat, Haliva responded, "If necessary, we will know how to do it", but did not elaborate.

Yadlin noted that it might have been necessary to reexamine whether the perception that the US is leaving the Middle East and that Iran has the upper hand is still relevant, he stated, “[It is better] not to reverse this perception just yet", because it is remain to be seen whether the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Soleimani indicates a continuing American willingness to exert force in the area. It’s still too early to determine.

Haliva did most of his service in paratroopers. He was a platoon leader in the raid led by brigade commander Shaul Mofaz on the Hezbollah stronghold in village of Maydoun in Lebanon in 1988. The force, led by Haliva, who had just finished the officer’s course a month earlier, identified two terrorists hiding behind a bush.

"It ended with us shooting like crazy into the bush and killing them", he said years later. Although the successful raid was an important chapter in his military life, the high level of soldiery, and the boldness demonstrated by Hezbollah operatives also left a strong impression on him.

Later, he served in all the positions in the paratroopers, including commanding a battalion, the brigade training base (when he was my commander) and the entire brigade. He also commanded the IDF’s Officer Candidate School (Bahad 1).

"DON’T WANT to be heard, God forbid, as cocky. There will be prices, sometimes heavy prices. War is not a pleasant thing at all and both sides pay prices for it. But I say clearly, the land forces are now ready to carry out their tasks", Haliva replied to Yadlin’s question about the IDF’s land-force readiness.

Are there any gaps? Sure, He said. There always will be. The elephant in the room was the criticism made by Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick about the "Gideon" multiyear plan, led by former IDF chief of staff, Lt.-Gen Gadi Eisenkot. Haliva said the plan significantly improved the land forces, but there are still gaps in force readiness.

In this context, he added, the "Momentum" multiyear plan led by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen Aviv Kochavi is supposed to bring significant reinforcement to land forces, with the aim of achieving a faster victory, at a lower cost of lives, in the next war.

How this settles with the recent decision to cancel the brigade exercises and to focus primarily on battalion and company exercises is unclear. Past experience shows that brigades which did not practice on the ground, as a maneuvering unit before fighting, achieved far from good results when battles occurred.

The transition government cannot pass a budget law, and without a clear budgetary framework, the "Momentum" multiyear plan could follow those written in Benny Gantz’s term as IDF chief of staff. The IDF, said Gantz in 2013, can give itself "a good grade in planning multiyear plans". The realization, as a result of the budget cuts that resulted from social protests, was a completely different story.

Haliva referred to a war game at the institute that dealt with an escalation scenario in the northern arena, mentioning that the manager of the game failed to motivate the various players, including Hezbollah, Iran and Syria, to escalate their response to a full-scale war. All parties strove to quickly close the escalation round and return to normal.

The reason, in his view, is that Israel’s enemies understand the power gaps between them, and the futility of war. In the event of a confrontation, Haliva said, "The result should be such that, at its end, the enemy has for many years distanced its desire to fight with us".

Yediot Aharonot commentator Shimrit Meir criticized this assessment on Twitter this week, stating, "We have a chronic tendency to assume that the other side wants to return to normal, a classic projection". We project our motives, perceptions and desires onto the other side, and it’s not at all sure that this is what the enemy wants and thinks.

Suffice it to recall IDF Military Intelligence Directorate statements during Operation Protective Edge about the upcoming end of the war, which were shattered every time Hamas chose to resume fighting and breach the ceasefire, in order to understand that in the next round of confrontation may be longer than expected.

One issue that the conversation hardly dealt with was the Palestinian issue. The IDF has been detecting an opportunity for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip for some time. It seems that despite what the military estimates, Hamas continues to raise the flames in an attempt to extort additional concessions from Israel. The demolition balloons, rockets and terrorist penetration attempts are just negotiating tools.

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", February 16, 2020)

Wisdom is in the timing | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

There’s a time to shut up and do, and a time to send a threatening message

From his appearances in the media, at conferences and even on social networks, the new defense minister, Naftali Bennett, seems to enjoy the position. There is hardly a day when he does not warn Israel’s enemies of its long arm. At the Makor Rishon conference, Bennett said that Israel should "move from containment to attack. "If we are determined we can remove Iran’s aggression forces from Syria", and warned Iran "Syria will become your Vietnam".

This is a nice sentiment, but the question is whether the minister is not too optimistic. Israel is waging a long, mostly secret, campaign against Iran to thwart its holdings in Syria, under which hundreds of special operations and air strikes were conducted.

Overall, the strategic achievement of these attacks seems to be the prevention and reduction of the Iranian forces (and its proxy Hezbollah) with certain weapons, with emphasis on precise missiles of wide range. As for the presence of Iranian forces in Syria, the effort is similar to an attempt to empty the sea with a spoon.

Former IDF spokesman Brig-Gen. (res.) Avi Benayahu recently commented on the first year of IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, noting that it was characterized by great courage, because within "this complex reality, the IDF under Kochavi continues to carry out open and secret counter-operations to defend the borders and to reduce risks".

That is true, but one of the factors that makes this complex is Russia’s presence in Syria. The publication (which was not approved by any Israeli or Russian source) that the Russians recently launched fighter jets to thwart Israeli airstrikes, shows that the rope the Russians are releasing to Israel has shortened.

Another issue is the huddle. In general, other than those in which Iranian forces were attacked, senior officials of the Israeli political and military echelons have avoided taking direct responsibility for attacks and sending tensions to increase tensions. So why does the minister make unnecessary threats?

In Haaretz, Yaniv Kubovich reported that senior officials in the defense establishment criticized the minister’s statements against Israel’s enemies. Obviously, in light of the upcoming elections, Bennett (like others, including the prime minister) is required to strengthen his public image, but it is best to remember that not "everything goes".

In this context, the principle underlying the tense Shadow over Babylon (Dutton Books, 1993), written by David Mason, a decorated officer in the British Army Welsh Guards, seems to be very relevant. In the book, which takes place after the Gulf War, Ed Howard, who "was a commissioned officer in the Royal Marines and the Special Boat Service" (page 24), is hired to plan and execute an assassination. "The target is Saddam Hussein" (page 149).

Howard assumes the mission was initiated by the British government, and it implements it through subcontractors to preserve its ability to deny its involvement.

Incidentally, at the beginning of the book, Mason wrote that there is an unwritten law whereby the leadership of the enemy is not harmed. However, he noted, there is a state that has never paid attention to this law and which has constantly persecuted individual people, in most cases terrorists, who have committed atrocities against its people, and that is Israel.

A striking example is the policy of Mason described the raid carried out by the Sayeret Matkal, the IDF General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, led by Moshe Ya’alon, to assassinate Yasser Arafat’s deputy, Abu Jihad, in Tunisia in 1988. In a fascinating episode about the operation on The kill List, the series created by military commentator Alon Ben David on Channel 13, Ya’alon said that the raid was "an operation in which you strike and withdraw without taking responsibility". Listening to Ya’alon may be problematic in the face of political reality, but the minister may at least read Mason’s book.

Bennett isn’t the only one talking too much. The investigative television program Uvda recently told the story of the botched Israeli covert operation carried out in the Khan Yunis in November 2018. That is another example of how Israel, in this case the IDF, is revealing unnecessary secrets.

Here, too, the reason is unclear. This is a great story about a Special Forces team that was captured in the heart of enemy territory, hit the terrorists and was rescued at the last minute, in what was not far from becoming a war. But it was better this time, as in publications about the Abu Jihad assassination, to wait about 30 years before telling most of the secrets.

This does not mean that one should always remain silent. Sometimes exposing security activity and sending a firm message by the senior political and military echelons may demonstrate the IDF’s capabilities to the enemy, and to deter him.

An example of this is the recent Commando drill in Cyprus. For more than two years the brigade units have been training on the island, the topography of which is similar to Lebanese mountainous terrain. The last exercise was the widest in scope so far.

BENNETT TWEETED about the exercise, stating that it was "complex and difficult and unfamiliar. That’s how you should practice. Hard is good. War is harder.” Such training is well known to Bennett, because after serving as a soldier in Sayeret Matkal he served as a team leader and company commander at the elite Maglan unit (and was considered a daring officer).

Media reports indicate that, like the minister, the commanders who participated in the training rated him as particularly successful. Lt.-Col. A., an ex-Sayeret Matkal officer who commands Egoz Unit, said in an interview posted on Israelhayom.com that the exercise allows "to train as close as possible to the war".

Maglan unit commander Lt.-Col. R., a Paratroopers officer, said in the interview that his soldiers required "meticulous planning to be prepared for any scenario, but also for high improvisation ability, to cope with the variables in the field".

Strengthening the ability to operate with a large force at the depth of enemy territory is essential for the next campaign, especially on a northern front.

Recently, a new edition of The Killing Zone (Maarachot, 2019) was published, in which Frederick Downs described his experiences as an US Army infantry platoon leader during the Vietnam War.

The introduction to the book was written by Maj.-Gen. Itay Virov, commander of the military colleges, who noted that the Vietnam War is now relevant to the IDF, due to the enemy’s pattern of action as a guerrilla army, similar to those in which the IDF fights today.

Virov did most of his service in Lebanon. In June 1999, as a Paratroopers battalion commander, he led an assault to eliminate the Hezbollah terrorist squad, and in the Second Lebanon War he commanded a reserve Paratroopers brigade.

He signed the introduction with a particularly accurate diagnosis of the type of campaigns Israel has fought in the last two decades in which there is no major decisive battle, such as the Egyptian Third Army Corps in 1973. In his view, "[In] a collection of tactical battles, the commanders’ determination and leadership, are the ones that have determined – and will determine – the outcome of the campaign".

It is important, then, to train the commanders in training that will simulate fighting as much as possible. And the enemy should also know that the IDF is preparing. Maybe that will deter them. If not, at least the troops will be ready.

and decide. Such a campaign will not last only one long day, but it is likely to begin with one – provided that it includes a determined operation of forces, in the air, on land and at sea.

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", December 13, 2019)