The General Staff: Management and Decision Making | by Gal Perl Finkel

At the outset of World War II, "the results of the German General Staff’s thinking and decision making on the battlefield outdid those of its French counterpart" (p. 11). This is what Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi wrote in the preface to a new book about the IDF General Staff by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel. Kochavi here underscores the importance of the General Staff and its ability to influence a campaign, in the present and in the future.

• originally published in "Strategic Assessment"
• Volume 24, No. 2, April 2021

At the outset of World War II, "the results of the German General Staff’s thinking and decision making on the battlefield outdid those of its French counterpart" (p. 11). This is what Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi wrote in the preface to a new book, "The Israeli General Staff" ( Modan, Maarachot Publishing, 2020), about the IDF General Staff by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel. Kochavi here underscores the importance of the General Staff and its ability to influence a campaign, in the present and in the future. Thus, he continued, "The General Staff must be a body that specializes in management and decision making for the immediate, short, medium, and long term, and especially in time of war, which is its greatest test. It requires training, knowledge, skill, teamwork and a critical attitude, and curiosity and creativity" (p. 11).

In this book, the author, formerly commander of an armored brigade and head of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, continues his previous book, The Chief of Staff, and the effort to analyze thoroughly and fundamentally the roles and challenges of the General Staff, which is the IDF’s strategic command that includes headquarters, military districts, and other functions, and to try to explain how it learns, plans, and functions.

The book includes four chapters of test cases. Each chapter concludes with a summary and the author’s recommendations, which are intended to help the IDF General Staff avoid the difficulties and errors presented in the chapter. In the fifth chapter the author presents his main insights and his recommendations for improving the work of the General Staff.

Methodology

The book presents a comparative analysis of the General Staff’s performance with regard to four roles and challenges: the planning processes in the General Staff, including multi-year planning for force buildup, operational planning for wartime, and planning during wartime; various learning processes of the General Staff, including lessons learned from war, learning from foreign armies, and processes of change; patterns of organizing in the face of evolving challenges, including the establishment of new staff bodies and the direct management of the General Staff; and chiefs of staff coping with a General Staff that opposed the outlook and changes they sought to implement, and with differences of approach within the General Staff.

Although the study is not a historical documentary, it was based on material from the IDF’s History Department and on biographies, media publications, and interviews the author conducted with senior officers who served in the General Staff over the years. Although each period was marked by different challenges and contexts, there are similar characteristics that can instruct about the recurring challenges, responsibilities, and roles of the General Staff. At the same time, and as the author insisted, it is difficult to examine the periods comparatively, since each period entails its particular challenges and strategic context.

The book’s analysis is detailed and systematic and offers enlightening insights. For example, in the chapter describing operational planning (planning for war), which is the principal process that the General Staff executes in the field of force, the author outlines the main characteristics of the General Staff planning process, including the nature of the plan and its basic assumptions, the need for modular and flexible planning, and the creation of coordination and synchronization between the General Staff, the command, and the operational branch (p. 97). Despite this, the author notes the analysis of former chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot:

An operational plan is designed to enable development of the required knowledge, to form the basis for a common language and the "compass" for force buildup…The nature of operational plans change when moving from plan to command in light of context. Therefore, the Chief of Staff emphasized that the plan is a means. The planning process, force buildup of the operational capabilities, and the readiness of the forces—those are the important things. (p. 103)

Indeed, throughout the chapter the emphasis is on the need for mental flexibility, planning, force buildup, and formulated responses that can be adapted to a changing reality.

A particularly fascinating chapter describes how the General Staff learns during combat, including through friction with the enemy (pp. 219-234). An example is the learning process that the General Staff conducted through the Central Command in the first year of the second intifada. The General Staff was faced with the dilemma of whether to continue defensive preparations or to transition to an offensive that included large-scale infiltration of forces into the heart of the refugee camps—a move that entailed possible achievements in the form of harming senior members of terrorist organizations and the destruction of weapons and ammunition, as well as considerable risk, since it included fighting in urban areas and in the heart of a civilian population.

The author quotes Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland, then-head of the Planning Directorate:

Those who led to the approval of the operations were the commanders of the infantry brigades. At that time, the IDF was blessed with four of the best brigade commanders it has ever had: Aviv Kochavi from the Paratroopers, Chico Tamir from Golani, Imad Fares from Givati, ​​and Yair Golan from Nahal. The commanders, and especially Aviv and Chico, persuaded the commander of the Central Command, Itzik Eitan, and the chief of staff to approve the operations. The operational achievements of these raids were partial, but the fact that the operations were carried out with a minimum of casualties—among both the soldiers and the civilian population—gave the assurance that it would be possible, when necessary, to enter and take over West Bank cities. One or two months later, the time for this did come [as part of Operation Defensive Shield]. (p. 228)

Although this is a fascinating example, it might have been better to include in the book another test case that has not yet been thoroughly investigated, and to examine the learning process conducted by the General Staff and the Southern Command in 2006-2008. The commander of the Gaza Division at the time, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Moshe "Chico" Tamir, a veteran of the Golani Brigade, initiated “constant friction” with the enemy through raids carried out by infantry and armored battalions, as well as elite units (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, 2020). These raids were necessary, according to then-Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, due to the need to "handle terrorist activity on the other side of the fence," including frequent firing of Qassams on the city of Sderot and other localities. "We did not have an ‘Iron Dome,’ we did not have a good answer, and we had to take action against this thing, in order to restore security" (interview with G. Ashkenazi, February 21, 2021).

According to Tamir, these operations were preceded by "very orderly and very didactic preparation," which built confidence in the ability of the forces to perform among the senior command levels that were required to approve them (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, 2020), among them Southern Command General Yoav Gallant, a veteran of Shayetet 13 (Lamm, 2008) and Chief of Staff Ashkenazi, who acknowledged their contribution since his days as a company commander in Golani “to the capabilities and self-confidence of the commanders” and their influence on the enemy (interview with G. Ashkenazi, February 21, 2021). Battalion commanders, including Yaron Finkelman from the Paratroopers (Harel, 2020) and David Zini from the Golani Brigade, then led raids across the fence in the Gaza Strip and struck terrorists in their territory (Pollak, 2015). These operations enabled the command, and through it to the General Staff, to accumulate knowledge, analyze Hamas’s strengths and weaknesses, and prepare accordingly for Operation Cast Lead.

Although the author notes in the book that the Southern Command and its then-commander Gallant carried "a great deal of weight in determining how the ground forces operate during the operation" (p. 273), he refrains from describing it in detail, as well as the process that preceded it—from the division to the command and to the General Staff. The successful result of the operation, Tamir stated, was "due to the combination of ground forces with air forces." They identified targets, he said, maneuvered with confidence, and hit enemy operatives (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, 2020).

Insights

The central and first component of the General Staff’s uniqueness, Finkel states, "is the strategic level that it oversees. Focusing on this level means a constant and systematic need for an up-to-date interpretation of reality, finding appropriate methodologies for developing a response to the new challenges, and establishing command and method mechanisms for IDF coordination and synchronization" (p. 461).

Moreover, the fact that the General Staff interfaces with the political echelon requires it to adopt its language as well as the language of the military—and the world and considerations of the political echelon are different from those of the military. "Building and maintaining a common language with the political echelon, especially if it changes, is a task that requires a variety of methods, such as discussions, visits, joint war simulations, and more" (p. 462).

The author made a good selection of test cases that describe the roles and challenges before the General Staff, noting that he was required to balance a range of tensions—chiefly the desire for maximum relevance versus the desire to produce cohesion between ranks and synchronization of efforts. For example, he notes the decision of Chief of Staff Dan Halutz during the Second Lebanon War to change the operational plan several times so as not to carry out an unsuitable plan. On the other hand, there is the attitude expressed by US General George Patton, considered one of the best generals in history, that "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week" (Hanson, 1999).

An additional tension is force buildup, as it is necessary to both preserve and improve the military’s competence for the challenges of the present on the one hand, and to implement modern means and try to shape the army for the challenges of the next decade on the other. An example, Finkel notes, can be seen in the short story "Superiority" by Arthur C. Clarke, in which "an attempt to develop advanced capability led to a temporary decline in effectiveness in comparison with the possibility of improving the old means, and to a defeat at the hands of an enemy that rapidly mass-produced less advanced capabilities" (p. 463).

The author points out that a decrease in the effectiveness of the IDF response could be catastrophic if war breaks out in the midst of updating the response. This applies to operational outlooks and operational plans that have not yet been implemented, and to weapons and advanced technological systems as well. Therefore, he writes, force buildup must be "based on flexibility, especially organizational-technological flexibility that includes components of balance, redundancy, versatility and the ability to change" (p. 464).

In the field of operational planning and in view of the fact that strategic context is changing rapidly, the author recommends the formulation of modular plans. Thus, in a limited campaign, Operation Cast Lead, for example, a plan that was originally intended to defeat the enemy fully can be only partially realized, while maintaining its relevance.

Missing from the Book

While an important and enlightening study, the book lacks up-to-date reference to the work of the General Staff vis-à-vis the political echelon, not only in the first three decades after the establishment of the state but in recent years, given Israel’s new threats and current challenges.

In the last two years, for example, much evidence has been published about the dialogue between the General Staff, headed by Chief of Staff Eisenkot, and the political echelon before Operation Northern Shield, until late in 2018, at Eisenkot’s initiative and with the approval of the political echelon, the IDF took surprise action and destroyed the Hezbollah tunnels on the Lebanese border (Farhi, 2020).

There is also a lack of reference in the book to the career path of the members of the General Staff and to the question of whether they were trained as necessary to act not only as commanders at the tactical level but also as commanders at the strategic level. In the IDF, most of the position holders (beginning at the rank of colonel) acquire the knowledge for their positions by on the job training, and the experience gained has enormous weight. Officers such as former Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yair Golan, who commanded a Paratroopers company and battalion in combat in Lebanon, and later a brigade and division, but also served in training positions and as head of the Operations section in the Operations Directorate; or Southern Command General Eliezer Toledano, who as an officer in the Paratroopers fought in the second intifada, commanded the elite Maglan unit in the 2006 war and raids in Gaza initiated by Brig. Gen. Tamir, and served as the Prime Minister’s military secretary (and therefore a member of the General Staff)—these officers did indeed go through a complete and varied service track, during which they gained experience both at the tactical and strategic levels. When the IDF designates commanders as having the potential for senior command, it is fitting that this approach constitute a guide for planning their career path.

Conclusion

Meir Finkel’s fascinating and comprehensive book is an important addition to an understanding of the role of the General Staff and its leader, its discourse with the political echelon, its responsibilities, the challenges it faces, processes, and role that have a tremendous impact on the entire country.

If in his previous book the author focused on the Chief of Staff, he has now made an in-depth analysis of the General Staff, which supports the Chief of Staff, learns, plans, and operates—in routine and in wartime—and of all of its various wings (planning, operational intelligence, logistics, and of course military districts).

In conclusion, it is worth recalling a statement by Gabi Ashkenazi while serving as deputy Chief of Staff, whereby the Chief of Staff is required to remember "the importance of the combatant echelon. They not only pay for our mistakes, they also correct them. Therefore, even today with all the budgetary difficulties, the lesson I’ve learned is—strengthen the combatant echelon!" (Channel 1, 2008). 

(Please refer to the original publication for the End Notes)

Between fire and maneuver, or a combination of the two | by Gal Perl Finkel

The damage to the enemy’s military power is achieved on land by ground forces

While Israel has invested considerably in air power and maintains its relative advantage in this field – beginning with Operation Moked in the Six Day War and more intensively in the last three decades – its enemies chose a cheap and foolish solution, but one that reduces the gap.

The first to understand this was Syrian President Hafez Assad. It was a lesson from the first Lebanon war, during which the Israel Air Force destroyed about a third of the Syrian Air Force and severely damaged its anti-aircraft forces. The Syrian president reduced and cut down the air force, which he himself commanded years earlier, and invested in acquiring a large-scale arsenal of rockets that pose a real threat to Israel’s population centers.

In the years preceding the civil war in Syria, Assad succeeded in creating a balance of deterrence against Israel. It was clear that Syria would attack Tel Aviv with precision rockets and heavy warheads, while Israel would send its planes to attack the Syrian capital. Assad received the proof that he was right during the Iraqi missile attack in the Gulf War. Israel was more or less helpless in the face of a threat on its population centers.

Hezbollah and Hamas, each according to its capabilities, also adopted the method and also have obtained an arsenal of rockets aimed directly at Israeli population centers. Also important are the Iranians, who are working to establish a similar arsenal that will threaten Israel from Syria.

In a lecture at the INSS annual conference in January 2014, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate at the time and now the leading candidate for the post of chief of staff, Maj.-Gen. Aviv Kochavi, said the IDF defined the period as an "era of fire." He emphasized, "There are many more missiles and rockets aimed from deep enemy territory to deep into Israel’s territory. They are much more distributed. They are much more accurate. They are much more lethal. We are talking about around 170,000 rockets and missiles that threaten the State of Israel."

Part of this change can be seen in the decision of the IDF to acquire a variety of rockets of varying ranges, from 30 km. to 150 km. Over the past two decades, the Artillery Corps has become increasingly sophisticated and technologically advanced. Media reports indicate that Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman intends to establish a kind of "rocket corps."

An Israeli response to the rocket arsenal that its enemies have established will provide the IDF with a rapid, destructive and precise operational response, which is economical in relation to its air response, and eliminates the need to endanger pilots in missions above enemy territory. In future confrontations, air force pilots will be unable to operate almost freely over enemy territory. It seems that the minister wants it to be that in such a case the IDF will not remain without a real alternative.

Under Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, the IDF has invested considerable resources in improving the capabilities of its ground forces and reserves. However there is another cost for such a significant investment in standoff firepower capabilities (Israel already invests huge sums in the IAF and in tightening the connection between current intelligence and precision munitions). Every investment in a particular field comes at the expense of non-investment in another field. When one buys an airplane, he sometimes gives up buying a tank, and when one buy planes and rocket launchers, he might harm the level of readiness of ground forces.

Thus, the IDF may find itself in a future campaign in a situation in which it relies almost exclusively on its capabilities in standoff firepower from the air, sea and land. The next campaign may be a standoff-firepower confrontation between the IDF and the enemy. Such wars, as demonstrated by the German blitz on London and the thousands of bombing raids carried out by the Allies over German cities during World War II, did not shorten the war or make real achievements. The British did not surrender, they only became more determined, as did the Germans.

At a recent conference of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, former deputy chief of staff, Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan, noted that there is a deep conceptual gap regarding the use of military force in recent confrontations, which led to the public’s disappointment with the way it ended, without a clear Israeli victory. Golan stated, "Anyone who has ever dealt in this field of warfare can understand that this belief that wars can be won only with the help of accurate intelligence and precise fire is a problematic assumption. In fact, I would say, it reduces the art of war to the level of technicians. And since the techs never won wars, it is reasonable to assume that they will never win wars."

Golan, who is also a candidate to become the next chief of staff, said the IDF should be built so that when Israel chooses, "We will hit our enemies with a hard and decisive blow. And when I say hitting our enemies, it’s hitting their fighting ability."

In his view, the assumption that harming infrastructure and the civilian population can bring the enemy to despair is wrong. "If we want relatively short wars, and if we want to bring the enemy to surrender, or to ask for a cessation of hostilities, we must first and foremost hit his military strength and his fighting ability," he said.

The meaning is an attack on the enemy’s operatives, whether they are soldiers or terrorists. The only way to do this, certainly in view of the serious threat to the home front, is through the old Ben-Gurion approach of transferring the war to enemy territory, and for this, the IDF must maneuver, and quickly.

The operation of ground forces is an expensive move, which includes the risk of casualties. In his lecture in 2014, Maj.-Gen. Kochavi – who, like Golan did his service in the Paratroopers Brigade and fought in Lebanon, Judea and Samaria – said that the maneuver “is not going to be simpler." According to him, in almost every village in Lebanon, forces will operate mainly in urban areas where there are "dozens of rockets, launchers and bombs – all modern weapons, not improvisations.

Therefore, it is already a semi-military organization, not a terrorist organization in the classic sense of the term. And, he said, "Maneuvering in this space becomes much more challenging."

Nevertheless, Kochavi said that Israel has "a basic interest in shortening the duration of the war." This has never been achieved by standoff firepower. Significant firepower must support IDF land forces. But in the end, as Israeli governments have learned in all the confrontations, from "Defensive Shield" to ,Protective Edge," the damage to the enemy’s military power is achieved on land by ground forces.

The writer is founder and operator of the blog "In the Crosshairs" on military, security, strategy vision and practice.

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", September 06, 2018)

IDF promotes officers who think outside the box, but still follow the line | by Gal Perl Finkel

In the end, the argument that the IDF promotes colorless rule-abiding commanders is simply not true

In the two rounds of appointments of generals to positions in the General Staff and of division commanders that Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot carried out in the recent year, there was criticism that the IDF preferred officers who sanctify discipline and obey orders at the expense of courage and creativity, and who showed no flexibility in punishing daring officers with creative thinking. Some also claimed that in the promotion of certain officers who did not command brigades and divisions in Lebanon and Gaza, the IDF lost exactly those commanders who think outside the box.

Another claim made is that the IDF does not promote officers from religious Zionism to key positions. These claims were reinforced by the decision of the chief of staff not to appoint Brig.-Gen. Ofer Winter as commander of the division. Winter did most of his service at the head of the column, at the front, and was considered a daring and creative commander. He enlisted in Sayeret Matkal, IDF’s elite unit; after the officers’ course, he moved to the Maglan unit (where he served with Minister Naftali Bennett) and served as a company commander in Lebanon. Winter commanded a battalion in the Givati Brigade in a series of operations in Gaza (he was decorated with a citation and the battalion was awarded the Medal of Distinguished Service for the first time in the IDF).

During Operation Protective Edge, Winter was the commander of the Givati Brigade. At the end of the campaign, a force from the brigade had an encounter with Hamas terrorists in the outskirts of Rafah that cost the lives of two officers and a soldier. The terrorists kidnapped Hadar Goldin’s body and escaped by tunnel. In order to thwart the abduction, Winter (according to the records of the communications network published on the Mako website) ordered "Hannibal Procedure" which was aggressive. The decision was justified, but there was also harsh criticism of the massive fire that he ordered to use, from which many Palestinian civilians who were not involved in terrorism were killed.

For some reason, the majority of those who rose for Winter’s defense chose to ignore the fact that during the period in which he served as the Givati brigade commander, the brigade had a series of disturbing incidents, including the irregularities and mishaps in the Tzabar Battalion, that its commander was Convicted and demoted for sexual misconduct towards a subordinate). Winter, as was published in Walla! Website, was questioned by the MPCID on suspicion of obstructing proceedings in the affair, because the deputy battalion commander came to him with the story only to be rejected and dismissed him from the brigade. In the end, as reported in Haaretz, Chief of Staff Benny Gantz rebuked Winter and wrote him a note in his personal file. It is also reasonable that the IDF commanders did not like the fact that Winter, according to an article published in al-Monitor by Ben Caspit, was apparently the officer who, without permission, informed his comrades-in-arms, Minister Bennett, about the tunnels at the beginning of “Protective edge”. It seems therefore that the decision not to promote him was motivated by practical motives. 

"An officer who sends his subordinates a message that it is possible to violate the laws because the goal justifies it, will create a bad atmosphere in which his subordinates will take the law into their own hands," wrote Itamar Kremer, an ex- Givati officer who serves in reserve as a battalion deputy commander. That message remains true. The claims that the IDF prevents the promotion of religious officers are wrong. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Elazar Stern, who joined the paratroopers in 1974, testified that he was "the only religious platoon leader, the only religious company commander," but since then times have changed. Although there will always be a personal dimension to the considerations for which officers are promoted, the impressive presence of religious officers at every level of command in the IDF proves more than anything that the military does not check what does its field commanders have under the helmet and promotes on the basis of skills and abilities as much as possible.

In the end, the argument that the IDF promotes colorless rule-abiding commanders is simply not true. The current General Staff members are experienced, opinionated and highly professional. Two of its members were my battalion commanders in the Paratroopers and I can testify that they are among the best and most experienced. The units they commanded were always better because of them and they left behind battalions, brigades, and divisions much more prepared for war. 

Among those officers who speak their mind and combine courage and ingenuity while obeying rules and orders are:

• Maj.-Gen. Tamir Heiman, an armored officer who also commanded the Northern Corps and now heads the Intelligence directorate.

• Maj.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, a Paratrooper officer who served as a company commander during the years the IDF fought in Lebanon, and later as the commander of Sayeret Matkal and now commands the Southern Command. Halevi, by the way, comes from a religious background. 

• A key figure in the General Staff is Air Force commander, Maj.-Gen. Norkin, who was the Head of the IAF Operations Department in the second Lebanon War (2006). 

• Generals Nitzan Alon and Nadav Padan, both ex-Sayeret Matkal officers.

• Maj.-Gen. Amir Baram, who spent most of his career in the paratroopers and led the 890 battalion in counter-terrorism operations during the Second Intifada. 

• Baram’s brigade commander in those operations (who was also his company commander when he joined the paratroopers’ anti-tank company), was Aviv Kochavi, now deputy Chief of Staff and a prominent candidate to replace Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eizenkot in January. 

• Another prominent candidate is Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan, also a paratroopers officer who commanded the Nahal Brigade in Operation Defensive Shield. 

General Baram once described Chief of Staff Eizenkot and his deputy Kochavi as commanders who "look for a different direction and would be happy if you challenged them." The IDF knows how to hold on to its creative commanders, even if there were failures during their service, and to promote them. The military is not looking for yes-men, but initiative and courage cannot come at the expense of proper conduct. 

The writer is founder and operator of the blog "In the Crosshairs" on military, security, strategy vision and practice.

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", June 18, 2018)

Israel defines redlines for Iran in Lebanon | by Gal Perl Finkel

Those who define redlines should be prepared to act when these lines are crossed

The escalated events over the weekend in the North exceeded several levels that has until now been the norm.

Firstly, it is a clear Iranian provocation. This is not a force that is supported and operated remotely by Iran, such as Hezbollah, but rather a clear and visible clash between Israeli and Iranian forces in which Iranian soldiers may have been killed. Second, the Israeli response is consistent with the doctrine recently presented by Minister Naftali Bennett, according to which Israel must act directly against Iran and not only against its proxies, including Hezbollah.

But the weekend of action does not stand in a vacuum, but rather joins a broader context of messages and moves, Israelis and Iranians alike, on the northern front.

Recently, Israel has been conducting an effort to deter Iran and the Hezbollah attempts to construct infrastructure for the manufacture of precision rockets in southern Lebanon. Indeed, missiles with heavy warheads and high accuracy are already in Hezbollah’s arsenal, in large numbers, and they also have significant range. But so far, the organization has been able to acquire them mainly through smuggling and arms shipments from Syria and Iran, and it seems there is a trend to cut out the middle man, or at least shorten the way.

As part of the effort, the IDF constantly presents high readiness for battle by exposing various exercises, including drills and publication of the acquisition of new weapons and capabilities. In addition, the IDF spokesperson, Brig.- Gen. Ronen Manelis, published an article in Arab media in which he warned the citizens of Lebanon that “Iran is playing with their security and future”. In the article, Manelis, a former intelligence officer, stated that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah are turning Lebanon into “one large missile factory”. This is no longer an issue of transferring arms, money, or counsel, he said. Iran has de facto opened a new branch, “the Lebanon branch – Iran is here”.

Israel identified the Iranian effort to establish missile manufacturing infrastructure in Lebanon some time ago, and sent threatening messages to Hezbollah. In addition to the IDF Spokesperson’s Office, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took the time, during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, to warn that Israel would not allow Iran to establish itself in Syria and would not accept the existence of precision missiles in Lebanon – and given the need will act to prevent it.

IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot also used his speech at a ceremony marking the 21st anniversary of the 1997 “Disaster of the Helicopters” to convey a message, saying that Hezbollah “violates UN Security Council resolutions, maintains a military presence in the region, possessing weapons systems and increasing its military capabilities. In the face of these threats, the IDF operates day and night”. Eisenkot also noted that he is confident of Israel’s military superiority, “the quality of commanders and soldiers and their ability to achieve victory in times of war and to inflict painful damage on the enemy”.

It is clear that Israel is making an effort to clarify for its enemies, as well as the international community, its redlines, in order to prevent and deter their crossing.

“We are following the processes of arms transfers in all sectors of the fighting”, former chief of staff Benny Gantz once said. “This is a very bad thing, which is very sensitive, and from time to time, when things are needed, things can happen”. If Israel’s message falls on deaf ears, one can cautiously assess that the need will arise and things may happen.

But a strike against the missile manufacturing facilities could be cause for severe Hezbollah response; the other side also has redlines. One of them is an attack on Lebanon and a violation of its sovereignty. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Israel, which radiates readiness and determination mainly for deterrence, will operate covertly.

Walking on the threshold of war by means of deterrence, and the possibility of miscalculation of one of the parties, or, alternatively, a too successful action which obligates the other side to respond harshly, requires Israel to be prepared for a confrontation. In a lecture given at the at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies (JISS) last December, former deputy chief of staff Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan said that in the next campaign Israel must take full advantage of the asymmetry between it and the hybrid terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and activate “the maximum of Israeli power at the same time on all enemy formations, everywhere, in the shortest time possible”.

The reality of confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon is well known to Golan. He did most of his service as a soldier and commander in the 35th Paratroopers Brigade. In 1987, he commanded the Paratroopers’ anti-tank company in “Operation Green Eyes” against Hezbollah headquarters in the village of Maydoun. At dawn, snipers from IAF special forces unit Shaldag opened fire on Hezbollah operatives, while at the same time the force led by Golan fired anti-tank missiles at Hezbollah positions and vehicles.

Later on he commanded the 890 Battalion and a regional brigade in Lebanon, and led the Nahal Brigade during “Operation Defensive Shield,” and before he served as deputy chief of staff he was the OC Northern Command. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006 he sent a letter to the chief of staff, Dan Halutz, in which he suggested launching a largescale ground operation. His proposal was declined.

Hezbollah has grown stronger and more experienced since 2006 and constitutes a grave threat to Israel’s home front. To remove the threat quickly, said general Golan in his lecture (just as he wrote in his letter to Halutz), “IDF ground forces must be used in a very decisive and very effective manner”. This rule, as well as the additional significance of a possible war in the north, should be taken into consideration by the government as it forms a policy against the emerging threat in Lebanon. Those who define redlines should be prepared to act when these lines are crossed.

The author is the founder and operator of the blog “In the Crosshairs” on military and security vision, strategy and practice.

 (The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", February 12, 2018)