The people and the U.S. are with the Golan | by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

U.S recognition in the Golan Heights as "part of the State of Israel" is an important political achievement for Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu, but it is not certain that the way it was done will not escalate a reality that until now has been tacitly agreed upon

Recently, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Nasrallah delivered a speech in which he responded to US President Donald Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

"The only option for the Syrians to return the Golan Heights, and the Lebanese to return the Shebaa Farms and Ghajar, and the only option for the Palestinians to accept their legitimate rights is resistance, resistance and resistance," Nasrallah said.

Beyond the border, in Syria and Lebanon, it is hard to believe that there will be tolerance for international recognition of the Golan Heights, which Israel captured in the Six-Day War (and managed to keep in its hands in 1973 and thereafter) as an Israeli sovereign territory. This could constitute a precedent for the possibility that additional areas will be recognized as such. Given that Hezbollah and other Shiite militias have established an operational infrastructure on the Syrian side of the border, as the IDF revealed last month (in a cognitive operation), Nasrallah’s declaration is a clear threat.

Last month, leaders of the Blue and White Party visited the northern part of Israel. Even though the four, Benny Gantz, Moshe Ya’alon, Gabi Ashkenazi and Yair Lapid were mainly focused in trying to recruit votes and supporters, its likely that the north is connected mainly to their experiences from the military service. The former chiefs of staff fought for many years across the border, some against the Syrians, all of them in Lebanon, in the raids of the Paratroopers (Ya’alon and Gantz) and Golani (Ashkenazi) brigades, and operations. Even Lapid, who was a military correspondent in Bamahane, spent (though not as a fighter) a considerable amount of time in his service in the outposts in Lebanon.

During the tour in the North, the four referred to threats by Hezbollah and Syria. In his press conference, Gantz stressed that there is an "Iranian front that sits on the border of the State of Israel, and we will know how to deal with any threat in any arena, as much as necessary." Lapid, for his part, pledged on behalf of the four, "We will never return the Golan Heights."

The person who took care of Lapid’s commitment was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who in the past was among those who negotiated with the Syrians, in which he was asked to give up control of the Golan Heights. During Netanyahu’s visit to Washington last week, President Trump signed a presidential proclamation recognizing the Golan Heights as part of the State of Israel. For Netanyahu, too, the North is connected to his personal military service as a soldier and commander in the Sayeret Matkal IDF elite unit.

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IN HIS book Autobiography, Maj.-Gen. (Ret.) Giora Eiland referred to the negotiations that Prime Minister Ehud Barak held in 1999 with then-Syrian president Hafez al-Assad and argued that Israel should not agree to a peace arrangement with Syria in which it relinquishes its control over the Golan Heights. Eiland, who like Gantz, Ya’alon and Ashkenazi, participated in raids in Lebanon (in one of them, as a paratrooper battalion commander, he took with him a stubborn platoon leader named Ofer Shelah, now number eight in Blue and White’s list), admitted that he had formulated his insights after his retirement. He noted that he had hoped that the negotiations between Israel and Syria would not grow into a peace agreement in which Israel would relinquish the territory.

In his view, Prime Minister Barak relied on wrong assumptions. First, if the Syrian army moved forces to the Golan Heights, Israel would know about this in real time, which is not necessarily true. Second, it is not at all certain that Israel would understand and correctly interpret the movement of Syrian forces aimed toward war (in 1973, for example, Israel did not understand this). Third, because of the time required for such a decision, the Syrians would be the first to arrive to the battlefield and gain the upper hand.

Another assumption is that an international monitoring mechanism that would enforce the agreement might indeed monitor tanks and cannons, but it would be less effective in detecting sophisticated surface-to-surface missiles with long range and accuracy, and anti-tank missiles, which are relatively easy to conceal but whose impact on the battle is significant.

It is hard to counter Eiland’s arguments – and since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria that undermined the stability of Bashar Assad’s regime, it became clear that other troubling scenarios might also materialize. Iran was allowed to establish military infrastructures in Syria and to act against Israel, which for its part is conducting a long and largely secret campaign to prevent it. As part of that campaign, according to foreign publications, the IAF recently attacked Iranian weapons depots near Aleppo.

WHY DO we need all this noise now? The Golan has been under Israeli control for more than 50 years and no state entity can take control of it without Israeli consent. Moreover, Trump’s statement, which appears to be a finger in the eye of the international community, has only motivated Western Europe, Russia, the Arab countries, Iran and Syria to act against it. The Syrians and their allies from Iran may also decide to "use terror and guerrilla attacks" from the Syrian side of the border, just as Nasrallah declared in his speech.

In the eyes of Israeli prime ministers, only one member of the international community is a heavyweight – the United States. This perception has not changed, and with good reason. American backing, even now, is a powerful credit. In an article on the subject in Israel Hayom, Maj.-Gen. (Ret.) Israel Ziv, who like Eiland served as a paratrooper officer and as the head of the Agaf HaMivtza’im (Operations Directorate), wrote that "Israel will be required to conduct an uncompromising legitimization battle, while increasing efforts to prevent Iranian entrenchment on the other side of the border. The American declaration on the Golan Heights will no doubt help these efforts."

Recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan is important, but the way it was done – not through the UN Security Council and without the broad consensus of the international community – is damaging. It is not certain that the tacit agreement to Israeli control over the Golan Heights, which was the American policy until now, would not have been more effective at this time.

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", April 7, 2019)

 

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A new strategy against ISIS/ By Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

His special forces teams increased their operational tempo to such an extent that they carried out 300 raids per month, dismantling al-Qaida cells one after the other

In US President Donald Trump’s first address to Congress he described Islamic State (ISIS) as a “network of lawless savages that have slaughtered Muslims and Christians, and men, and women, and children of all beliefs. We will work with our allies, including our friends and allies in the Muslim world, to extinguish this vile enemy from this planet.”

Trump is not the first to view an organization of Islamic extremist, Salafist jihadists as a network. One of the first to do so was retired US Army general Stanley McChrystal. In his book The Insurgents (Simon and Schuster, 2013), Fred Kaplan describes McChrystal as a special operations expert. “He entered the force as a parachutist in the 82nd Airborne, then rose through the ranks in Ranger and special forces units, climaxing in the fall of 2003, when he took control of the Joint Special Operations Command.” According to Kaplan’s book, “McChrystal saw that al Qaeda was a network, each cell’s powers multiplied by its ties with other cells. It would take a network to fight a network, so McChrystal built one of his own.” Under his leadership JSOC’s network worked. His special forces teams increased their operational tempo to such an extent that they carried out 300 raids per month, dismantling al-Qaida cells one after the other.

On January 2017 President Trump ordered the new US defense secretary, USMC Gen. (ret.) James Mattis, to conduct a 30-day review of US strategy on ISIS. Mattis is supposed to get back to the president with a full range of options to fight that threat. The previous administration chose a counter-terrorism strategy that refrained from using “boots on the ground.” Instead president Barack Obama preferred surgical strikes using drones and special forces, while avoiding at all costs the use of ground forces on a large scale. That was the strategy that led to the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen by a US drone strike and Operation Neptune Spear in Pakistan, during which SEAL Team Six killed Osama bin-Laden. The latter was led by McChrystal’s successor at JSOC, Adm. William McRaven, himself a former Navy SEAL.

In addition the US adopted a policy of “leading from behind” – providing support through intelligence, air power and special forces to the campaign waged by local ground forces. This was the case Libya and now in the war against ISIS. That’s understandable given the fact that in a war such as this there are no magic solutions. One knows where it starts but not how or when it ends. Usually it turns to a bloody and prolonged war. The ground maneuver, as shown during Operation Protective Edge, is only the beginning: the forces become vulnerable to IEDs, snipers, anti-tank missiles and mortars. Threats familiar to US troops from their wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Secretary Mattis is a combat veteran who knows the Middle East and Iraq in particular, having fought there more than once. He led the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in the Gulf War, commanded a Navy-Marine task force in Afghanistan, and the entire 1st Marine Division during the march on Baghdad and the battle for Falluja. He understands better than most the danger in sending troops into, as former secretary of state Gen. (ret.) Colin Powell described in an article, “a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish.” 

However that policy didn’t prove as useful in the fight against ISIS. Deploying ground forces is not without cost, but on the other hand is highly effective when it comes to hurting and defeating the enemy. That was, for example, the case in Operation Cast Lead, during which the IDF’s 35th Paratroopers Brigade, led by Col. Herzi Halevi, operated in the midst of the Gaza Strip, killed Hamas militants, destroyed the enemy’s arsenal and effectively prevented rockets from being launched at Israel’s cities.

“I’m in the business of providing the president with options,” said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff USMC Gen. Joseph Dunford recently, in regard to the forming of a new strategy against ISIS. Dunford, who served under Mattis in Iraq as the commander of the 5th Marine Regiment, revealed that there are currently around 500 US special forces soldiers in Syria, working with Syrian Kurdish and Arab forces in their efforts to strike the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa, in what he called “about as complex an environment as you can be [in].”

Though it’s not likely that the new strategy will include the use of large-scale ground forces, given the background of Secretary Mattis and CJCS Dunford, one can assume that they understand the need for a growing presence of US troops on the ground.

That presence will probably will be reflected in increased activity of special forces, mainly from JSOC. The current commander of JSOC is Gen. Austin Miller, who just like McChrystal began his career as a paratroopers officer (82nd Airborne Division), served in the Rangers and commanded a contingent of Delta Force operators in the Battle of Mogadishu (and was awarded the Bronze Star). The most significant operation so far carried out the during his term as commander of JSOC is the raid carried out by the Navy SEALs on an al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) headquarters in Yemen. The operation, the first commando raid authorized by Trump, turned into a shootout in the midst of the village because the force was compromised before hitting its objective. Navy SEAL Chief Petty Officer William “Ryan” Owens was killed and three others were wounded. 14 AQAP fighters were killed in the raid, some of whom were also terrorist network leaders and facilitators.

In his resent speech to Congress President Trump led a standing ovation for the Owens’s widow. Trump assured her that according to Secretary Mattis, her husband “was a part of a highly successful raid.” In the movie Annapolis, Lieutenant Cole (played by Tyrese Gibson), the company commander and a tough Marine, presents the cadets with a body bag and demands they “remember what that bag looks like with a body in it, because if you become officers this is where they’re going to put your mistakes.” That rule, that is very familiar to generals, applies to leaders of state as well, and should be taken to into account prior to approving the new strategy against ISIS.

The author is the coordinator of the Military and Strategic Affairs program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and the founder and operator of the blog “In the Crosshairs” on military, security vision, strategy and practice.

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", March 7, 2017)

US national security adviser faces challenges at home and abroad/ By Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

Gen. McMaster will have to familiarize himself with all these challenges quickly, with a much broader perspective than the one he perhaps had in the past

President Donald Trump chose Lt.Gen. Herbert Raymond “H.R.”McMaster as his new national security adviser. The appointment saga has become a complex issue, especially after it became clear that the candidate the president wanted, retired Vice Adm. Robert Harward, a former Navy SEAL with a distinguished career in the special operations community, turned Trump down.

Harward turned the offer down supposedly due to personal reasons, but according to CNN a friend of Harward’s said that since his condition of choosing his own team was not met, he considered the job a “shit sandwich.” Although the choice to go with McMaster is a very reasonable one in light of his impressive career, it is worth noting that since he is still on active duty he couldn’t say no to the job.

General Herbert Raymond McMaster has spent most of his career in the US Army Armored Branch. During the Gulf War he led the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment Eagle Troop at the Battle of 73 Easting. Though surprised by the enemy and significantly outnumbered, McMaster’s nine tanks destroyed over 80 Iraqi Republican Guard tanks and other vehicles without loss. McMaster was awarded the Silver Star. Before becoming national security adviser his most recent position was deputy commanding general of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Throughout his service he has excelled in developing theoretical knowledge, formulating strategy and understanding political processes. McMaster, who holds a PhD in American history, wrote a book that explored the military’s role in the policies of the Vietnam War, and it’s widely read in Pentagon circles.

The decision to leave Gen. Keith Kellogg in his position as chief of staff of the National Security Council is a sound one. Kellogg fought in the Vietnam War as reconnaissance platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division (and like McMaster was awarded the Silver Star). Later on he commanded the 82nd Airborne Division and held a leading position in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2004.

Unlike McMaster he is by now familiar with the civilian world, and other aspects of foreign policy, and will be there to help McMaster learn the ropes.

McMaster is a soldier’s soldier. However the position of national security adviser is much more comprehensive.

Stephen J. Hadley, national security adviser under president George W. Bush, wrote an article that defines the job description of the office. According to him the adviser must staff and support the president in his constitutional role in national security and foreign policy, and advocate and advance presidential initiatives within the executive branch. The adviser must also coordinate “those important or consequential initiatives and policies that require the concerted effort of multiple departments and agencies to achieve a presidential objective,” and inject a sense of strategy into the interagency process.

Finally he must explain the president’s policies to the public.

Hadley summarized the way it should be carried out. According to him the adviser should be an “Honest Broker,” which means he must run a “fair and transparent process for bringing issues to the President for decision,” and to maintain a “level playing field” in which ideas and views can compete with one another on an equal basis. The adviser must bring all the national security principals to table as full participants in the policy process. The adviser must “Make sure the national security organizational structure and the interagency process are meeting the President’s needs and evolve over time.”

Hadley also pointed out a few minefields the adviser should stay away from such as inserting himself between the president and the principal cabinet secretaries and agency heads, or undermining national security colleagues with the president. The adviser must always put the president at the center of the decision making process, for he is the “decider.” Therefore the adviser should keep a low public profile and operate generally off stage, and always accept responsibility for his actions.

Two main challenges await the next national security adviser: the political arena and global affairs. The current political atmosphere in Washington, DC, is poisons. The Flynn debacle showed that those who oppose the Trump administration will stop at nothing to achieve their agenda including leaking highly classified documents. McMaster will have found himself in the eye of this political storm the minute his name was announced. Things in Washington appear to be so bad that during a recent military conference Gen. Raymond Thomas, the commander of the Special Operations Command and a former Army Ranger who has two combat jumps (Grenada and Panama), stated that “our government continues to be in unbelievable turmoil. I hope they sort it out soon because we’re a nation at war.”

In the international arena, McMaster inherited a mess. Russia annexing Crimea undermined the world order.

Iran, Russia and China continue to harass US military forces with impunity and immunity. The lack of Western response to the Russian provocation emboldened Russia and encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin to spread throughout the Middle East.

Putin allied himself with Assad’s regime in Syria and took an active role in fighting the regime’s opposition.

The Syrian and Russian armies carry out the most serious war crimes in a generation, indiscriminately bombing civilians and hospitals.

China continues its march throughout the South China Sea claiming territory it does not own in international waters, while increasing its military spending and developing weapons that undermine the US advantage in the Pacific theater. Iran is on a slow but steady course to obtain nuclear weapons. By signing the nuclear deal Iran improved its financial situation, hence it was able to enhance its efforts at exporting revolution and sign new weapons purchasing agreement with both Russia and China.

Iran has increased its ballistic missile development program and performs (in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions) more ballistic missile tests than ever.

North Korea also continues its nuclear weapons development and tests its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.

In addition there’s the war on terrorism. Islamic State (ISIS) has killed thousands and operates in 18 countries around the Middle East and central Asia. In Afghanistan the Taliban is regaining old positions, causing mayhem and threatening the population and the central government.

Gen. McMaster will have to familiarize himself with all these challenges quickly, with a much broader perspective than the one he perhaps had in the past. Then he must form a national security policy that’s appropriate and relevant. Otherwise, someone will write a book about his term in office with a similar title to that he chose for his own book: Dereliction of Duty.

The author is the coordinator of the Military & Strategic Affairs program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", February 22, 2017)

General Mattis: a Warrior Diplomat/ By Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

Mattis can restrain the president-elect and prevent him from dismantling the American system in the name of anti-establishment

Two weeks ago President-elect Donald Trump chose USMC General (ret.) James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis as his secretary of defense. Unlike Israel the United States has a tradition of appointing a civilian as secretary of defense, to ensure civilian oversight of the military. If Mattis is approved by the Senate he will be the first general to hold the position since George Marshall in the ‘50s.

The desire to appoint a civilian stems from the fact that the main role of the secretary of defense isn’t to command troops in the field – the Unified Combatant Command as well as the national security adviser and the president are responsible for that. The primary function of the secretary of defense is to shape the military strategy and the defense force buildup of the United States. Therefore his business is the civil context of the military, including the size of the military budget, and the interface with the defense industries and the House of Representatives.

These are issues that the American public must engage with, and not the military and its senior commanders.

When a person has served as a soldier for over 30 years, we can assume that, as the saying goes, he will sit where he stands. His mindset, the focus of his work and his expertise will be on military action. In Israel, for example, some of the former senior military officers who served as defense minister wrongly thought the defense minister was a representative of the military in the government and not the government supervisor of the military. Nevertheless, the appointment of General Mattis is extraordinary.

In the book The March Up (Bantam, 2003) written by Francis “Bing” West and Maj. Gen. (ret.) Ray Smith, USMC, they describe the famed 1st Marine Division’s march on Baghdad.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom they acquired an SUV and joined the unit that was spearheading the assault. They described the division commander, Gen. James Mattis, as a “Marine’s Marine,” and wrote that “Mattis’s life, not merely his career, had centered on command in the field. He had a remarkable record of infantry leadership: a rifle platoon; a rifle company; an infantry battalion like Conlin’s; an infantry regiment; and a Navy-Marine Task Force” (page 18). In 2001, as the commander of that task force, “Mattis had taken a reinforced battalion 800 kilometers from ships in the Indian Ocean to a dirt airstrip in Afghanistan – no small feat” (page 78).

Despite the fact that the authors served in Vietnam as Marine infantry officers and were experienced in all aspects of combat “from the ground up,” they were impressed by Mattis, who commanded his division in a swift and aggressive manner that reminded many of the way general Patton led his troops in WWII (Marines will probably prefer to compare him to USMC Gen. “Chesty” Puller).

Mattis’s 1st Marine Division had feinted and slashed through six Iraqi divisions and, ignoring orders to slow down, had seized the eastern half of Baghdad weeks ahead of schedule.

MATTIS LED Marines into combat against a changing enemy, from insurgents to regular army formations in the Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq, and was awarded a bronze star for valor. Though Mattis appears to be what is known in the IDF as a plain, outspoken “Golanchick” (member of the Golani Brigade), he is actually an avid student of warfare who understands geopolitical strategy as well as the new trends in the battlefield. As the commander of US Central Command he was also an important diplomatic representative of the US administration in the Middle East.

He opposed the nuclear agreement with Iran, which he saw as a major threat to regional stability, and criticized the Israeli settlement enterprise as an obstacle to peace.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USMC Gen. Joseph Dunford, as well as USMC Gen. John F. Kelly, selected by President-elect Trump for the position of Secretary of Homeland Security, served under Mattis during the campaign in Iraq. West and Smith wrote that Dunford “was the commander most apt to pick up on Mattis’s invitation to offer alternatives to the division’s planned scheme of maneuver. His regiment, with more than a thousand vehicles and six thousand men, had been the division’s Main Effort since crossing the Euphrates” (page 135). That campaign, as well as the fighting in Fallujah, formed a close comradeship between the three officers. As such Mattis will probably refrain from becoming Dunford’s boot-camp drill instructor and work closely with him.

As someone who understands the limits of power, the importance of the US’s relationships with its allies, the need for proper planning and preparations and the importance of a responsible and restrained strategy, both domestically and internationally, Mattis can restrain the president-elect and prevent him from dismantling the American system in the name of anti-establishment. Mattis very well may be the responsible adult in the room.

Before embarking for the campaign in Iraq Mattis posted a letter to 1st Marine Division which ends with the phrase: “Demonstrate to the world there is ‘No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy’ than a US Marine.” As a senior member of President-elect Trump’s cabinet, Mattis will probably try to implement exactly that policy.

The author is the coordinator of the Military & Strategic Affairs program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", December 12, 2016)

President-elect Trump – the ‘West Wing’ lesson/ by Gal Perl Finkel

רשומה רגילה

During the time left before he takes office, President-elect Trump should conduct an in-depth study of the many responsibilities that await him

In a speech given last month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (USMC General Joseph Dunford) addressed the true weight of estimates and assumptions. Dunford told the audience about task force “Smith” (TFS), an infantry battalion of the 21st Regiment US Army, which was the first force to encounter the invading North Korean army during the first few hours of the Korean War.

In that war, said Dunford, the US military fought on the ground, at a time and in conditions it did not expect, and the initial results were disastrous.

“I like to remind people who have a high level of confidence in assumptions on when, where and how we will fight the next fight, that the Korean War took place right after some of the best strategists that we’ve ever produced as a nation decided to rebalance to Europe.”

Seven hours after task force “Smith” encountered the enemy 185 US soldiers were wounded and dead.

That’s what assumptions can do,” said the general, and therefore the US must strengthen its forces’ readiness for unexpected developments.

The US elections are behind us. It’s been said that “assumption is the mother of all messups,” and that rule applies to lesson learned from TFS encounter. In this case, all that was needed was to erase all that was written before the morning of Wednesday, November 9, and rewrite it so it will be relevant to the new reality.

There are cases, as described by Dunford, where the price of assumption is much heavier.

During the time left before he takes office, President-elect Trump should conduct an in-depth study of the many responsibilities that await him. Until now Trump focused mostly on campaign issues and devoted his attention to defeating other GOP contenders, but now the focus will shift to governing related tasks: appointing cabinet members, developing a legislative schedule in cooperation with GOP leadership and developing an action plan for the first hundred days of his presidency.

“The first hundred days” index, traditionally used to assess one’s presidency, originated with president Franklin Roosevelt, who in his first hundred days in office carried out his “New Deal” to rescue the economy from the Great Depression of the Thirties. Trump, needless to say, isn’t Roosevelt, but even Reagan, who won the Cold War and in the early days of his administration solved the Iran hostage crisis, was similarly criticized before taking office.

In the third episode of The West Wing, a serial political drama about the Democratic administration of President Josiah “Jed” Bartlet (played by Martin Sheen), the new president is required to decide how to respond to a terrorist attack guided by the Syrian government. During the attack a US Air Force transport plane is shot down. The president refuses to accept the proportional response proposed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Fitzwallace, and replies that “from this time and this place, gentlemen, you kill an American, any American, we don’t come back with a proportional response. We come back with total disaster!” Moreover, the president demands the admiral and the national security team take the next 60 minutes and put together an American response scenario that doesn’t make him think they are just “docking somebody’s damn allowance!” It’s more than likely that after Trump’s election some people remembered that scene and imagine that this is (more or less) the way that the new president will behave in his first meeting with the Joint Chiefs in the situation room.

During Operation Protective Edge that West Wing scene went viral among Israelis’ social network accounts. Israel advocacy groups, mostly from the political Right, presented it in support of their argument that Israel should stop the IDF’s proportional attacks on the Gaza strip and move to disproportionate response. However, the rest of the episode holds a far more important lesson: in the next scene President Bartlet is proposing an air-strike scenario that includes attacking extensive critical infrastructure in Syria, which could lead to a humanitarian crisis. Bartlet understand the consequences, but despite the expected tragic loss of life, he can’t “dole out five thousand dollars’ worth of punishment for a fifty-buck crime.”

That is what the creator of the series, Aaron Sorkin, was trying to teach the audience: a limitations of power lesson.

Even the sole superpower in the world can’t do as it pleases (or as it’s commander-in-chief pleases).

“We must not, for example, send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish,” wrote Gen. Colin Powell, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Powell’s rule of thumb directed President Barack Obama throughout his administration. The complexity of conflicts at the present time taught him not to rush to send forces into harm’s way before formulating a coherent strategy and a defined endgame. For example, Obama has refrained from sending ground forces to battle against Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, since such an action may well mire the US in a war of attrition.

As an alternative, the president approved an unprecedented number of special operations and air raids.

Earlier this month it was reported that the 82nd Airborne’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team is deploying to Iraq. The 1,700 paratroopers, from one of the toughest divisions in the world, will continue training, advising and guiding Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS, but will not take an active role in the fight. In contrast, about 100 soldiers from the US Army special forces are taking part in the campaign in Mosul, and are responsible for directing precision strikes from air. It’s unlikely that during the Trump administration there will be a change in the scope of “boots on the ground” that Americans are willing to invest in that fight.

Trump’s closest security adviser is General Michael Flynn, who is considered a prominent candidate for the position of secretary of defense, or national security adviser. Flynn joined the US Army as a graduate of the ROTC and volunteered for the paratroopers, but spent most of his time in service as an intelligence officer and in his last position was the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Flynn has stated more than once that the United States should soften its policy toward Russia.

In 2013, a year before he retired, the DIA held a seminar to commemorate the 30th anniversary Operation Urgent Fury, the US invasion of Grenada in ‘83. Flynn, who fought on the ground as a platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division, said then that it was the first time he “ever saw a dead American soldier in a body bag.”

The general also and said that “being ready for the unknown – that’s one thing that DIA has always been at the front of.” He, like Trump, may find that the Russians, as General Mark Milley recently warned, are playing a game of their own aimed at achieving power and influence while disrupting American interests.

In 69 days Donald Trump will become the commander-in-chief of the strongest army in the world. He will not have a hundred days of grace, or even a few hours, before being required to go into the situation room with generals Dunford, Milley and probably Flynn, and decide how the US will respond to any given event. He will then learn the hard lesson about the limitations of power and that the view from the chair of the presidential candidate is very different from the view from the one located at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

In the fifth season of the West Wing, due to the constitutional crisis the speaker of the House, a right-wing conservative Republican (played by John Goodman), takes over the presidency, and is discovered, to the surprise of the characters and the viewers, to be a smart, cautious and moderate strategist. It could happen now, as well.


The author is the coordinator of the Military & Strategic Affairs program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

(The article was published in "The Jerusalem Post", November 15, 2016)